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SUMMARY
As modern attacks become more stealthy and persistent, detecting or preventing them
at their early stages becomes virtually impossible. Instead, an attack investigation or
provenance system aims to continuously monitor and log interesting system events with
minimal overhead. Later, if the system observes any anomalous behavior, it analyzes the log
to identify who initiated the attack and which resources were affected by the attack and then
assess and recover from any damage incurred. However, because of a fundamental tradeoff
between log granularity and system performance, existing systems typically record system-
call events without detailed program-level activities (e.g., memory operation) required for
accurately reconstructing attack causality or demand that every monitored program be
instrumented to provide program-level information.
In this thesis, I will present my research focusing on addressing this issue. First, I
will present a Refinable Attack INvestigation system (RAIN) based on a record-replay
technology that records system-call events during runtime and performs instruction-level
dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) during on-demand process replay. Instead of
replaying every process with DIFT, RAIN conducts system-call-level reachability analysis
to filter out unrelated processes and to minimize the number of processes to be replayed,
making inter-process DIFT feasible. Second, I will present a data flow tagging and tracking
mechanism, called RTAG, which further enables practical cross-host attack investigations.
RTAG allows lazy synchronization between independent and parallel DIFT instances of
different hosts, and applies optimal tag map to minimize memory consumption. Evaluation
results show RTAG is able to recover true data flows of realistic cross-host attack scenarios
with low time and memory cost. Furthermore, we deployed RAIN and RTAG in the red team
adversarial engagements funded by the DARPA Transparent Computing program. The data
generated by our system effectively reconstructed the causality of the attacks with high




Cyber attacks have grown to be a pressing issue because a great deal of user data shared
and stored in the digitized services are being stolen, tampered and misused, particularly at
large vendors and internet service providers. Numerous data breach incidents have affected
millions of people, causing their identities to be stolen, and private information such as social
security to be exposed [1, 2, 3, 4]. According to the public Gemalto [5] report, on average
1.8 billion records are stolen every year since 2013. The burden on vendors, government and
the technology industry to secure the data is higher than ever. For example, in 2018, multiple
consumer groups in Europe accused Google and Facebook of not safely protecting user
data and requested compensation [6]. Once a data breach happens, a postmortem forensic
analysis needs to find out which data have been really stolen, who is impacted, and why
the incident happened. Unfortunately, forensic analysis is often complicated by stealthy
malware behaviors such as blending with benign activity [7] and staying in-memory only [8].
As a result, users are now torn between the difficulty to defend their systems, and the strong
demand for safer systems. With the increasing importance of mitigating these disastrous
attacks, researchers explore accurate system monitoring tools while maintaining the system
performance without incurring high overhead.
In pursuit of an effective forensic analysis to understand what and why the incident
happened and its impacts, many have explored different forensic investigation systems.
However, it is challenging to achieve both accuracy in the analysis and efficiency in the
system monitoring. Some system monitoring tools efficiently capture course-grained events,
like system-call events for analysis, but have no access to the program’s fine-grained behavior
such as memory operations (Section §2.1 presents the related work of this kind). On the
other hand, dynamic program analysis tools provide fine-grained data such as user behavior
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at instruction level, but incur an prohibitively high overhead to the program (Section §2.2
presents the related work of this kind). This thesis shows we can achieve the best of these
two worlds: an efficient system with low runtime overhead, but with the ability to monitor
the program behavior as low as the instruction level.
We observe that the coarse-grained information is usually an abstraction of the fine-
grained data, which we can use to guide the fine-grained analysis. For example, by tracking
system call trace, one can know when a program starts and ends execution, what and when
it performs file IO or network IO operations, etc. Such information provides a valuable clue
for what the fine-grained analysis should focus on. For example, when verifying a potential
data leakage in a data exfiltration incident, the fine-grained analysis only needs to perform
dynamic taint analysis on the part of execution between reading a sensitive user file, and
sending data to a remote host, instead of the entire long execution.
We propose using coarse-grained analysis to identify the part of the execution having
causal relation to the attack, then perform the fine-grained analysis on those only. The
fine-grained analysis is delayed from the program execution runtime without incurring high
overhead of instrumentation. Upon a request for analyzing an attack, we perform a search
and pruning procedure to narrow down and pinpoint the executions related to the attack,
which we call “refinement”, then we focus on replaying and performing the fine-grained
analysis only on these executions at the memory level with single-instruction granularity.
We present a framework called refinable attack investigation that brings the benefits
of the two worlds: high efficiency in program runtime, and the ability to observe program
behavior at fine-grained granularity, even in today’s complex multi-host systems. The
following thesis statement summarizes the contributions of this document:
Refinement enables the forensic analysis to have fine-grained analysis at the per-
formance cost of coarse-grained analysis, even in today’s complex multi-host environ-




In order to maintain an efficient program runtime, we perform the refinement-guided
fine-grained analysis at a delayed time. We adopt the decoupled analysis to remove the
analysis from the program runtime, and delay the analysis until offline time. As a good
candidate, record and replay technique such as Arnold [9] achieves this decoupled analysis
by efficiently recording the non-deterministic inputs to the program such as file input and
data synchronization (less than 10% overhead), then replaying the execution by enforcing
the same inputs. Particularly useful for forensic analysis, record and replay can faithfully
replicate the same control flow and memory states during replay so the analysis can observe
fine-grained user behavior such as memory operations at instruction level. These systems
such as Arnold [9] focus on recording individual programs. For the complete coverage for
monitoring, every program executed in the system is supposed to be logged or recorded.
This causes the overhead in analyzing all the program executions to be surged. As a result,
the forensic analysis needs to search for and locate the executions related to the attack from
high volume of system-wide logs and recorded data. For example, over 20 million system
events are generated per day on average on a typical desktop according to Sysdig [10].
Replaying and analyzing all these behavior takes a long time and thus is still impractical.
To tackle this challenge, we need refinement along with the decoupled analysis that largely
reduces the search space and workload of analysis, making the decoupled analysis practical
for accurate system-wide monitoring and attack analysis.
1.2 Refinable Attack Investigation
Refinement allows us to make strong claims about past system behaviors, without the high
overheads of instrumentation at program runtime. During one analysis, the refinement
identifies the executions having causal relationship with the attack and directs the replay
to focus on those executions. Following this direction, we first present RAIN, a practical
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Refinable Attack INvestigation system, that selectively provides an memory-level detailed
log while minimizing runtime overhead. RAIN satisfies these conflicting goals using a
system-call-level record-and-replay technology and on-demand dynamic information flow
tracking (DIFT). RAIN continuously monitors and logs system-call events and additional
data for later replay while constructing a logical provenance graph. When it detects any
anomalous event in the graph, it performs replay-based DIFT from the event to prune out
any unwanted dependency. Performing DIFT for every process in the graph, however, is
unfeasible because the overhead of DIFT is too high (usually around 10×–20× and at best,
2.7×, using decoupling techniques [11, 12]). Instead, RAIN performs system call-level
reachability analysis to extract a subgraph tightly related to the anomaly and then conducts
DIFT only for processes belonging to the subgraph. The runtime overhead of RAIN is less
than 5% on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark, while the offline analysis is shown to be able
to resolve the data dependency explosion problem with dynamic taint analysis and the root
cause analysis on memory corruption based attacks. Moreover, we show the effectiveness
and performance of RAIN in a red team exercise performed by DARPA.
1.3 Cross-Host Investigation
As the majority of today’s systems are networked, attackers have made lateral movement to
infiltrate the victim’s network and started to steal sensitive data, not from a single host, but
with multiple hops of hosts. We extend to consider the case in the networked systems and
how we resolve the particular challenges of data dependencies across different hosts. For
example, a security team demoed an attack leveraging the git protocols [13] to exfiltrate user
data from inside an enterprise crossing three hosts, the developer’s desktop, the git server,
and the attacker’s controlled domain. Due to the stateful data communication between hosts,
running the refinable system separately on each host cannot effectively recover the linked
data causality across multiple hosts. Instead of orchestrating the replays of executions on
different hosts, we propose a new mechanism called RTAG, to decouple the dependencies of
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data flows from the execution, and make the replays independent with each other, thus they
can be performed in parallel. We show this technique reduces the complexity and time cost
of replaying for cross-host scenarios by over 60%. In addition, by applying optimal sizes to
the tagging of analyzed data, we show lowered memory cost by up to 90% when performing
dynamic taint analysis on multiple recorded executions.
1.4 Adversarial Engagements
Security solutions are known to suffer from a “cat and mouse” game, where attackers are
constantly racing with defenders. To show that our approach creates a sound, reliable,
and real defense against these attacks, we opened our system to assault by a professional
red-team group. Our systems managed to survive the attacks without data loss and our
generated data reconstructed the attack behavior with high accuracy. We deployed RAIN
and RTAG in the red team adversarial engagements funded by the DARPA Transparent
Computing program. The results show that our system does not suffer from this cat and
mouse game, even in the presence of knowledgeable attackers.
The goal of the red team is to evade the detection and analysis by leaving no trace: they
loaded themselves reflectively into memory to avoid executing from disk; system calls were
leveraged to avoid commonly monitored APIs such as file open() and write(); modules
were loaded in-memory for network recon, screen capture, audio capture, video capture, and
keylogging; and privilege escalation and process injection are introduced to pivot to other
processes. The RAIN and RTAG systems were customized and deployed in such adversarial
environments to generate data of system events for a set of teams to analyze and detect
attacks. Besides the system-call-level events, we also provide a query interface for the
analysis teams to query for the fine-grained causality information based on the results of
replay and dynamic taint analysis. We have successfully achieved these two goals. The
results of the engagements show the analysis teams are able to detect every attack activity
using our data. In addition, by making fine-grained queries to our replay and dynamic taint
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system, the analysis teams are able to improve the detection accuracy by removing false
positive cases.
1.5 Exploration on New Record Replay System
Though the record replay technique achieves low-overhead recording, the fine-grained
forensic analysis for auditing the replayed execution is unnecessarily slow, because the
replay still needs to go through the instrumentation with high overhead at the “delayed”
time. We aim for a more efficient fine-grained forensic auditing of replay executions.
Instead of solely relying on the replay to reconstruct every program state, we aim to
record the needed events for auditing, which enables faster recreation of program states at
the replay time. More generally, we explore an “analysis-aware” record and replay system
that records certain data according to the analysis (e.g., recording data flow only).
We came up with two solutions for this goal. First, for a data-flow-analysis only record-
replay, we record all the data flow at the program runtime so we can guarantee recreating
it, which is sufficient for most popular forensic analyses. Second, we explore a custom
recording environment that focuses on an efficient transformation from replay state to record
state based on the specific analysis.
We tried to use a new Intel CPU feature for the first solution, i.e., Intel Process trace and
process trace write [14]. Unfortunately, this trial is not successful. Though these features
impose very little overhead, they tend to have data losses when being used in the scenario
such as a data flow recorder. Coupled with program throttling, the data loss can be relieved
but it adds 50%-200% overhead when running the standard benchmark. Currently, we are
turning to explore the second solution which customizes the recorder by transforming the
replay state to record state. As a hybrid approach, it records both the inputs and program
states directly, which works as a combination for providing the data for the analysis and thus
has the potential to achieve high efficiency in the replayed execution.
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1.6 Thesis Roadmap
We will present how RAIN implaces the refinement to enable efficient analysis on system-
wide executions in §3, and how RTAG extends to handle the data dependencies for networked
systems in §4. Then we present how these systems worked and performed in the adversarial
engagements by DARPA in §5; we finally present our exploration on a new record replay




Previous works in system monitoring and auditing strive to either ensure a low-overhead
program runtime, or a fine-grained analysis having access to the memory space of the
program. Unfortunately, none of them achieves both. Researches in record replay systems
enables an decoupled analysis from the program runtime but they are either constrained in
a single program or a massive whole-system replay including the operating system. None
of these previous systems fits the goals of refinable forensic analysis. This thesis focuses
on pursuing a fine-grained analysis at memory level, an efficient program runtime, and
a significantly more efficient analysis suitable for system-wide auditing workload. This
chapter iterates over the previous works in different categories.
2.1 System-call-level Analysis
Most attack detection systems that rely on system-call-level events track the program’s
interaction with the operating system. Such systems can detect malicious behaviors that
particularly leave a trace of file/network IO operations. The performance overhead of such
systems is lower than 10% such as DTrace [15], ProTracer [16]. Many of these systems
(e.g., [15, 17, 10, 18]) have been accepted in the industry for system monitoring. For
example, Linux supports the Linux Audit system [18], which records information about
system events. PASS [19, 20] is a storage system that automatically logs and maintains
provenance data. SPADE [21] is a cross-platform system that logs provenance data across
distributed systems, and Linux provenance modules (LPM) [22] is a generic framework
that allows developers to write Linux security module (LSM)-like modules that define
custom provenance rules. In addition, ProTracer [16] is a lightweight provenance tracking
system that supports system event logging and unit-level taint propagation, which is based
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on BEEP [23]. However, none of the systems provides the instruction-level fine-grained
provenance data that RAIN provides because they cannot achieve one of their main goals—
minimizing runtime overhead—should they provide instruction-level provenance data.
2.2 Memory-level Program Analysis
Many advanced attacks involve fileless movements or lateral movements via IPC without
explicit system call invocations, which escape the detection by the above systems. For
example, the well known ssh injection attack [24, 25] relies on an integer overflow bug to
achieve remote code execution. No system call event exists for the corruption in the memory,
since it is a pure userspace operation without any system interaction. Due to the fact that a
great number of exploits rely on memory corruption bugs such as use-after-free [26] and
integer overflow [27], it is not sufficient to learn how the memory corruption occurs with the
exploit payload just by analyzing the interactions between the program and the operating
system [17, 10, 15]. To reason about the root cause and the vulnerability of the program,
memory-level userspace instrumentation is demanded for analyzing memory states of the
program even at single instruction step running with the exploit payload.
Though several dynamic binary instrumentation tools (e.g., Intel Pin [28], DynamoRIO [29])
are able to achieve this, they themselves incur high overhead (30%–100%) to the runtime
of program. Dynamic taint analysis [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35] is a well-known technique for
tracking the data flow from a source to a sink. Taint analysis is useful for runtime security
policy enforcement [30, 31], malware analysis [34], and privacy leakage detection [35].
However, because of its excessive performance overhead (e.g., the overhead of one state-of-
the-art implementation, libdft [33], is six times as high), it is difficult to use it in a general
computing environment. To solve this performance problem, several studies have proposed
decoupled taint analysis techniques [11, 12, 36, 37]. The purpose of these techniques is
to run a target process with a CPU core while performing taint analysis for a process with
other idle CPU cores. Apparently this cannot be adopted in practice. Hence, researchers
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are motivated to explore methods with the same level instrumentation while having low
overhead at runtime.
2.3 Record-Replay-Based Decoupled Analysis
Unlike the deterministic replay technique that faithfully replays the previous execution (e.g.,
in [38, 39, 40, 41]), the replay-based decoupled analysis technique enables sophisticated
analysis during replay. Arnold [9] is a state-of-the-art record-and-replay system supporting
decoupled analysis during replay. The two main advantages of Arnold over two similar
systems, Aftersight [42] and PANDA [43], are 1) its minimal recording overhead and 2) its
process-group-wise replay with Intel Pin. These advantages stem from the implementation
of Arnold inside the Linux kernel. By contrast, Aftersight is based on both a VMWare
hypervisor (record) and QEMU (replay), and PANDA is purely based on QEMU. The main
disadvantage of Arnold is that, unlike the other two systems, it is built inside the kernel, so
it cannot record and replay the execution of the kernel.
As we have shown, these previous works achieves some goals of a good system for
forensic analysis, but none of them has achieved all of the goals. Our systems enjoy the
strengths of the previous systems, showing a system with accurate memory-level analysis,





Since modern, advanced attacks are sophisticated and stealthy, collecting and analyzing at-
tack provenance data has become essential for intrusion detection and forensic investigation.
For example, many attack investigation or provenance systems monitor and log interesting
system events continuously to identify which process interacted with an unknown remote
host and which process accessed or modified sensitive files. If the systems find such a
suspicious process, they will analyze its previous behaviors to determine whether it was
attacked and which resources were affected by it.
Attack investigation systems, however, entail a practical limitation because of their two
most important but conflicting goals—collecting a detailed log and minimizing runtime
overhead. To ensure an accurate attack investigation, an instruction-level log would ideally
record the execution of all of the CPU instructions of all programs. Nevertheless, such
systems [44, 45, 34] also incur tremendous runtime overhead (4×–20×), so they are imprac-
tical in real computing environments. Therefore, as many attacks eventually need to use
system calls to access sensitive resources and devices, other practical systems [22, 21, 23,
16] mainly focus on system-call information, the collection of which incurs low runtime
overhead (below 10%).
Although system-call-based investigation systems are practical, they suffer from depen-
dency ambiguity and explosion [23] because it is difficult to reconstruct accurate attack
causality with only system-call information. For example, when a process reads from a
number of sensitive files and sends some (encrypted) data to a remote host, knowing which
sensitive files the process sends (or it might not send any sensitive data) without instruction-
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or memory-level data-flow tracking that system-call-level log cannot provide becomes a
challenge. To overcome this limitation, several systems [23, 22, 46, 16] instrument moni-
tored programs to obtain interesting program-level information by modifying their source
code or rewriting their binary code. Nevertheless, this approach is not scalable; that is, it
must instrument each program again whenever it is updated. More importantly, it cannot
cover dynamic code execution (e.g., code injection, self-modifying code, and return-oriented
programming), which is frequently used by exploits.
We propose RAIN, a practical Refinable Attack INvesti-gation system, that selectively
provides an instruction-level detailed log while minimizing runtime overhead. RAIN satisfies
these conflicting goals using a system-call-level record-and-replay technology and on-
demand dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT). RAIN continuously monitors and logs
system-call events and additional data for later replay while constructing a logical provenance
graph. When it detects any anomalous event in the graph, it performs replay-based DIFT
from the event to prune out any unwanted dependency. Performing DIFT for every process
in the graph, however, is infeasible because the overhead of DIFT is too high (usually around
10×–20× and at best, 2.7×, using decoupling techniques [11, 12]). Instead, RAIN performs
system call-level reachability analysis to extract a subgraph tightly related to the anomaly
and then conducts DIFT only for processes belonging to the subgraph.
We evaluated RAIN using the red team exercises produced by the DARPA Transparent
Computing program [47] and a recent real attack (StrongPity). These cases include normal
background traffic with complex programs such as the Firefox web browser. Evaluation
results show that RAIN is able to capture fine-grained causalities that accurately uncover the
behaviors and effects of attacks, and in most cases the false positive rate is negligible. The
runtime overhead is as low as 3.22% on SPEC CPU 2006, unlike previous instruction-level
investigation approaches [44, 45, 34] whose runtime overhead is 4×–20×. Further, RAIN
effectively reduces the number of processes to be replayed with DIFT and filters out, on
average, more than 90% of processes. This is a considerable improvement in performance
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over the previous approach, which has to replay the entire system and conduct DIFT against
all processes.
Motivating Example. To illustrate the constraint of existing provenance systems and the
contribution of our work, we refer to a recent attack called StrongPity [48]. The attack
infected over 1,000 systems in Italy and several other European countries in late 2016.
The purpose of StrongPity was to steal and tamper with the victims’ data by means of
compromised data transfer or archiving tools. Take, for example, Alice, a finance manager
who maintains and manages contracts and bidding files. Alice usually uses a popular ftp
extension called FireFTP in her Firefox browser to transfer files to other hosts, such as a
machine hosting the shared folder for her team. In the first step of the attack, the extension
in Alice’s Firefox is upgraded to one that contains a backdoor, resulting from the distribution
site of FireFTP, which has been compromised. A malicious extension accesses Alice’s file
system, collects data from certain files, and sends the data to an attacker’s controlled site.
In addition, the extension modifies certain incoming files before they are saved which also
pollutes files that rely on the modified ones.
As we mentioned earlier, conventional system call-level tracing and auditing cause false
positives in damage assessments when the source of the program (Firefox and FireFTP
extension) is compromised and source instrumentation (if any) becomes untrustworthy.
For example, the system call traces in Figure 3.1 indicate data leakage by connecting any
read system call from sensitive files to the send system call directed to the malicious site.
Many of these flows may be spurious if the user-space browser does not actually propagate
the data from the file to the remote host (i.e., not all of the files being read are actually
leaked). Similarly, many of the processes and files indirectly affected by interactions with
the tampered file may not actually be affected at all. One needs to track the user-space data
flow to precisely identify these dependencies.
With RAIN, after discovering that a host is controlled by an attacker, an investigator
















Which file is leaked?
Figure 3.1: Example of causality inaccuracy (i.e., dependency explosion) in system-call-level
provenance data.
DIFT, RAIN returns a provenance subgraph that contains the exact data leakages to the host.
Although the malicious extension reads a number of files, it leaks only a small portion of
them. By providing accurate analysis, RAIN saves the company from the fear of a large
scale data leakage. We will revisit this example and elaborate on the details of the analysis
in the following sections.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• A refinable attack investigation system. We propose a new attack investigation
system that efficiently records system-wide events in terms of system calls during
runtime and refines the log with DIFT during replay to recover fine-grained causality.
RAIN satisfies two conflicting yet important requirements: low runtime overhead and
fine-grained causality information (at the CPU instruction level), both essential in the
forensic analysis of attacks.
• On-demand inter-process DIFT. Instead of applying DIFT to whole-system events [44,
45, 34] which introduces tremendous overhead or which is likely infeasible, we intro-
duce graph-based reachability analysis to filter out unrelated processes and selectively
perform DIFT which makes inter-process DIFT feasible for attack investigation.
• Accurate and comprehensive attack investigation. We improve the accuracy of
object-object, object-process, process-process causalities (§3.5.2) and significantly






























Figure 3.2: Overview of RAIN architecture.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: §3.2 describes our threat model. §3.3
provides an overview and describes the architecture of RAIN. §3.4 describes system logging
and record-replay techniques, and §3.5 explains the provenance graph. §3.6 presents the
reachability analysis and the process of identifying triggers. §3.7 describes how RAIN
performs selective DIFT, and §3.8 summarizes its implementation and presents the results
of evaluation. §3.9 discusses limitations and future work, §3.10 summarizes related work,
and §3.11 concludes.
3.2 Threat Model and Assumptions
Our threat model is similar to those proposed in previous system provenance studies [22,
16, 19]—an OS and monitoring system are a trusted computing base (TCB). We take, for
instance, an attacker who tries to attack the applications and resources of a system protected
by RAIN and whose main goal is to exfiltrate sensitive data kept in the system or manipulate
it to propagate misinformation. To achieve this goal the attacker may install malware on the
system, exploit a running process, or inject a backdoor.
To realize a practical, refinable attack investigation system we assume the following:
First, we assume that all of the attacks against the system begin after RAIN is deployed—that
is, RAIN begins recording all of the attacks from their inception. Hardware trojans and OS
backdoors are out of scope of this work. Second, we assume that although an attacker could
compromise the OS or RAIN itself, the attacker has no way of manipulating the previous
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provenance data containing attack attempts on the OS or RAIN. That is, although we can see
the attacker attempting to compromise the OS or RAIN, any data recorded after a successful
attack may not be reliable. In the future, RAIN could ensure data integrity by using previous
secure provenance logging techniques [49, 50] and managing the provenance data in a
remote analysis server. Also, by using state-of-the-art integrity-checking mechanisms [51,
52, 53, 54, 55], RAIN could determine when such an incident has occurred. Another
assumption that we make is that an attacker uses only explicit attack channels, not side and
covert channels which are beyond the scope of this work. Although RAIN does not yet have
a solution stopping these attacks, we believe a record-and-replay approach has the potential
to detect attacks as shown in [56, 57].
Note that although some instruction-level attack investigation systems [34, 44] are
capable of detecting attacks against an OS, they are too slow to be used in a real comput-
ing environment and are mainly applied for in-depth malware analysis, running a small
number of samples in a controlled environment. Thus, we only assume integrity-checking
mechanisms in this work.
3.3 Overview
This section presents an overview of RAIN, a record-and-replay-based system that efficiently
logs the whole-system events during runtime and conducts DIFT during replay to accurately
determine fine-grained causal relationships between processes and objects (e.g., files and
network endpoints) created during the execution of user-level processes.
Figure 3.2 represents the architecture of RAIN, which consists of two main components:
the target host and the analysis host. In the target host, RAIN’s kernel module logs all system
calls that user-level processes have requested, including the return values and parameters that
RAIN will use to generate a provenance graph. RAIN also records the execution of user-level
processes by using kernel modules and an instrumented libc library to replay the processes
later on. It collects all necessary information to reproduce the complete architectural
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state of user-level processes (i.e., all non-deterministic values including random numbers).
The target host then sends the system call and record logs to the analysis host (§3.4). In
the analysis host, the provenance graph builder consumes the received system call log to
construct a coarse-grained whole-system provenance graph that contains many security-
insensitive causality events (§3.5). To refine the coarse-grained provenance graph, RAIN
first detects triggering points representing suspicious events in the graph (e.g., accessing
a sensitive file). Next, it initiates a reachability analysis (i.e., upstream, downstream, and
point-to-point analyses) from the triggering points to create security-sensitive provenance
subgraphs (SPS), which consist of basic units that replay with DIFT (§3.6). While selectively
performing DIFT, the replay engine of RAIN replays each SPS to construct fine-grained
causality subgraphs (§3.7). Lastly, with the fine-grained causality subgraphs, RAIN refines
the original whole-system provenance graph to detect the true behavior and damages of any
sophisticated attack that we were not able to observe in the original provenance graph.
3.4 Replay-able System Logging
3.4.1 System Logging
The system logging component resides inside the kernel of the operating system as a kernel
module. We hook the system call table to intercept the arguments and return values of
causality-related system calls. The component logs the semantics of system calls between
kernel objects and events such as open, read, write file operations and connect, recv,
send network operations. We also include essential semantics such as the file path and the
file descriptor in the open syscall.
To uniquely identify the object, we log the related kernel semantics of processes and
files, which include inode, major, minor, gen for files, and pid, tgid for processes. We
also refer to kernel data structures if necessary (e.g., to get the string of a file’s path from
the file system structure, dentry) which enables us to reduce the log size for constructing
the provenance graph to focus on unique processes and objects. We use the relayfs ring
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buffer to efficiently transfer the system call logs from the kernel to the user space. The logs
are packed, compressed, and transmitted off of the target host to a security-assured analysis
host.
3.4.2 Enabling Replay-Ability
Compared to previous system logging schemes [16, 22, 58, 18], RAIN not only logs
semantics for building the coarse-grained provenance graph, but also the non-determinism
that enables faithful replay. For this purpose, we reuse Arnold, the open-source framework
of a process-level record replay technique [9]. As an advantage, Arnold supports the
independent replay of processes so we do not have to replay the entire system’s execution
(e.g., [43, 44]) for analysis. RAIN extends Arnold so that it supports system-wide recording,
which accounts for every process execution in user-space. As a result, RAIN can replay any
part of the system’s execution on-demand for selective DIFT without losing completeness.
To replay the execution faithfully, Arnold records the return value of system calls, IPC
communications such as signal and system V queues, and caches the data for every file or
network I/O system call. For multi-threading applications, the pthread library in libc
is hooked to record and enforce the order of the thread switch. To handle shared memory,
Arnold replays involved processes cooperatively to regenerate shared data, and to improve
the replay reliability. It also records and replays random numbers as well as RDTSC by using
prctl(PR_SET_TSC,PR_TSC_SIGSEGV) from [59].
RAIN aims to detect and analyze attacks that may have previously gone undetected,
so instead of being confined to a predefined list of known programs, Arnold’s process
level record-replay technique has been extended from a single process to system-wide
executions. Although RAIN does not replay all of the recorded executions for refining
attack provenance owing to the reachability analysis (§3.6) and selective DIFT (§3.7), this
system-wide feature is critical as it enables us to refine any demanded part of execution. We
achieve this by hooking the execve syscall inside of the kernel so that when a program is
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loaded via execve, we force it to become a recording process by creating the recording
contexts. Throughout the analysis RAIN can replay each demanded execution independently
to resolve the associated fine-grained causality.
3.4.3 Storage Footprint
The storage use of RAIN comes from system logging and recording. We serialize the logging
data using the Apache Avro [60] binary format, which incurs around 500MB–2GB per
day for desktop use in our experiments. On the side of recording, the file, network I/O
cache constitutes most of the storage cost. To optimize storage use, Arnold [9] applies
compression, caches the data using “Copy-on-RAW”, and manages the data pieces in a
B-tree. In our experiment, the record logs of system-wide executions (excluding the OS) on
a desktop produce around 2GB of storage per day. Therefore, the storage cost is 2.5–4GB
per day (or less than 1.5TB per year). With the market price for a 2TB hard drive or cloud
storage being around 50 US dollars, we believe that our storage cost is both reasonable and
affordable. Note that instead of selectively storing data [16], we choose to store all of the
raw data first and then generate the provenance graph selectively, following a set of pruning
algorithms (§3.6). Our storage footprint reflects the size of raw data.
3.5 Provenance Graph
We construct a graph structure called Provenance Graph which contains the whole-system
execution during the entire period of monitoring. RAIN uses this graph as the basic model
to represent system objects, events, and their causal relationships. We begin by processing
the syscall logs. When first constructed from system logging, the graph is coarse-grained. It
is then pruned and refined incrementally according to analysis requests. We use nodes to
represent system objects and edges to represent causality between system objects.
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Table 3.1: Granularity of analysis.
Causality Granularity
Process-Object Coarse level
Object-Process Coarse + Fine level
Process-Process Coarse + Fine level
Object-Object Fine level
3.5.1 Nodes
Nodes in the provenance graph can be classified into two categories: processes and objects.
Processes represent user-level processes. Objects represent files and network endpoints. All
nodes contain a timestamp that represents the time that the entity (represented by the node)
was generated by the operating system. Each process node contains pid, tid, and process
name. Each File node contains the full path name of the file and inode, major, minor, and
gen which uniquely identify a file. Nodes representing network endpoints contain the IP
address and port of the network entity. Note that the tracking scope of RAIN does not extend
beyond the target host. In other words, we treat the remote host as a black box and do not
track its internal logic or state. This limitation can be addressed if we apply RAIN on the
remote host and causally relate the two hosts, but we will explore this issue in future work.
3.5.2 Causality Edges
Edges represent causal relationships between nodes in the provenance graph. We define four
types of edges: process-object causality, object-object causality, object-process causality, and
process-process causality. Among these causalities, we observe that only the process-object
causality can be tracked reliably by syscall-level logging. The remaining causalities require
either full or partial fine-grained user-space tracking. We summarize these granularity
requirements in Table 3.1.
Process-Object Causality. Process-object causality, which denotes the causal relationship
between a process and an object, is established when a user-level program accesses a file
or network object. As the operating system provides these I/O services to user-space, this
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causality can be captured by syscall logging (i.e., file or network I/O) without false negatives.
For example, the data can be loaded from a file to the memory of process via a read syscall
or written to a file from the process via a write syscall. In the case of a read syscall, the
process has a directional edge to a file; and the case of a write syscall, a file node has an
edge to a process. Similar causalities exist between processes and network endpoints. In
the case of a mmap syscall, the direction of causality is determined by the syscall arguments
such as PROT and FLAG.
Object-Process Causality. Object-process causality is established when the object affects
the execution of a process or its control flow. Usually the process has an edge from an
executable file if that file is loaded and executed by the process. RAIN captures this causality
by monitoring the execve syscall. The use of libraries is typically tracked by open, mmap,
or dlopen syscalls. However, this causality may not be true by just analyzing syscalls.
For example, the developer may include libraries but not use them. To affirm causality
between processes and libraries, we need to further track the control flow to see if its value
(address) exists within a library’s address space such as that described in [30]. Particularly
for sophisticated attacks, an accurate object-process causality is crucial for detecting control-
flow hijacking and identifying the sources of exploit payloads that could be used to access
library functions. We accurately determine this type of causality during the DIFT phase.
Object-Object Causality. Object-object causality occurs in the case of data flow between
two objects. The data flow inside of a process starts from an inbound object (e.g., via
read syscall) and ends at an outbound object (e.g., via write syscall). One can infer
this type of causality by simply pairing inbound and outbound objects. However, simply
monitoring file or network I/O syscalls (e.g., our motivating example in §3.1) or statically
analyzing on the program is inaccurate because we need to track the data propagation in the
user-level execution. As the dynamic taint analysis is prohibitively expensive, RAIN tracks
the Object-object causalities during replay (§3.7).
Process-Process Causality. Process-process causality is based on the relationships be-
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tween two processes. Processes can be causally related if one is cloned by the other via
the clone syscall, or they could be related because of inter-process communications (IPC).
Some IPCs (e.g., pipe, message queues, and semaphores) can be observed from syscalls.
However, causality cannot be accurately determined in the case of shared memory. Even
though a mmap or shmget syscall indicates the establishment of an IPC channel, it does not
necessarily mean data was actually exchanged between processes. To track such causality,
RAIN relies on DIFT to monitor data propagation among memory operations.
3.5.3 Graph Construction
We construct the provenance graph by linking nodes and edges according to the above
causality definitions. Our construction is based on uniquely identifiable objects. Since pid
and inode are recycled if a process is terminated or file is deleted respectively, we use path
as a unique identifier of processes and files (as nodes) since the collision of these objects
with the same name is low in practice. After being processed from system call logs, each
entry of a node or an edge is compressed and stored in a binary format. When requested for
analysis, those within in the time frame are converted and imported into a graph database.
In particular, we used Neo4j [61].
Semantic-Preserving Aggregation. Naturally, edges from I/O events such as read and
write constitute a large portion of the graph. However, many are called successively
indicating a single “large” read or write syscall execution. Therefore, we aggregate these
successive calls for conciseness as inspired by [62]. For example, we merge two read
syscalls as long as no other file system call occurs between them (e.g., a “write” to the same
file). Note that we collapse these successive syscalls in an “indexing” style so that we do not
remove the unique semantics of each individual edge. Thus, the selective DIFT still has the
flexibility to perform taint tracking between desired I/O syscalls. The aggregation alleviates
the traversing and storage costs of edges by 10%–50%.
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3.6 Coarse-Level Pruning
After constructing the coarse-grained provenance graph, we prune it to generate a security-
sensitive provenance subgraph (i.e., SPS) in two steps: a triggering analysis and a reacha-
bility analysis that uses the results of the triggering analysis. The SPS will be used as the
target for selective DIFT, in which fine-grained causalities will be resolved.
3.6.1 Triggering Pinpoint
In the initial provenance analysis, we apply a set of methods to scan the logs and identify
suspicious (i.e., security-sensitive) processes, events, and objects. The triggering analysis
relies on three approaches: external signals, security policies, and customized comparisons.
We perform the analysis offline by examining the provenance graph. This process can be
done earlier when system call logs are available as with conventional intrusion detection
systems [17, 63, 10].
External Signals. External signals are notifications from partners or third parties (e.g., an
anti-virus company). For example, an analyst may receive advice from an anti-virus vendor
to specifically check for the existence of certain executable files. All events performed by
these executables can be labeled as triggering points. In our motivating example, the victim
receives a notice that the distribution site of the FTP extension was compromised. This
triggers an analysis of all behaviors of the browser starting from the malicious extension
update.
Security Policy. Security policy checking also serves as a triggering pinpoint method.
Based on administrative security policies, we create a set of policies that define concerning
events used as triggering points for analysis. These policies include processes interacting
with sensitive files or a sequence of events that deviates from the typical pattern of system
calls. For example, it is a violation that a process reads from certain sensitive files and then
sends read data to an unknown remote host. Recent research has shown that the detection
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of attacks based on system-call sequence analysis can be improved with machine-learning
techniques [64].
Customized Comparisons. We sometimes need to compare the states of objects at
different times or locations to identify suspicious points. Take the data-tampering case in
our motivating example. In order to identify files that have been tampered with, we compare
the files (e.g., by comparing their hash digests) that have been downloaded via the browser
extension to the original version of these files. If they differ, the tampered files are used as
triggering points. This type of comparison typically requires application-specific semantics
which are useful but not the focus of this work. For example, Gyrus [65] compares user
interface (UI) inputs and network outbound traffic to determine user intention discrepancies.
3.6.2 Reachability Analysis
Starting from the identified triggers, we perform a reachability analysis to become aware of
the potential original source(s) and impacts. This analysis prunes out unrelated executions
and enables our DIFT to focus on resolving fine-grained causality in the attack-related
executions. Although our DIFT is performed offline, the high cost of DIFT is not eliminated
but migrated which is also pointed out by [11]. Hence we argue that it is still impractical to
perform full taint tracking, even if it is performed offline. With reachability analysis, we set
boundaries on the DIFT, avoiding tainting “dead” branches or regions of the graph.
The reachability analysis extends the triggering points to uncover possible upstream
origins, downstream impacts, and causality paths between two points. Even though at this
stage the graph includes only partial causalities (§3.5.2), computing the SPS on top of it and
pinpointing the part that desires further DIFT is sufficient for capturing the the remaining
causalities. With the SPS we can efficiently perform DIFT with a clear scope rather than
the whole graph. We present the analysis interface in Algorithm 1 and the graph traversing

















































Figure 3.3: Coarse-level pruning and fine-level refinement on the motivating example.
Upstream and Downstream Pruning
Upstream pruning reversely scans the provenance graph from the triggering point and prunes
out unrelated nodes and edges. The analysis follows the information flow and time sequence
to extend the subgraph such that Subject→ (write/send)→ Object→ (read/recv)→
Subject. For example, in Figure 3.3, from the attacker’s site (node “A”), we scan the send
or write events to A; after finding Firefox (node “P1”), we further scan read or recv
events that P1 performs earlier. For the shared memory case in process-process causality, we
also scan for the syscall events that establish the IPC (e.g., shmget and mmap) and extend
the SPS to that process. For downstream pruning we check forward events resulting from
the suspicious processes and other files that are affected afterwards. Pruning also follows
the information flow and extracts the downstream SPS. Pruning is either naturally bounded
(meaning no more related causality is found) or bounded by the network interface. The
gray shaded node indicates that process P2 is pruned from the SPS because of the negative
interference between files B and D. The red-shaded nodes represent files on the causality
path from origin F to attacker site A via file C.
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Point-to-point analysis indicates whether and how two points are causally related in the
graph. This analysis works on top of upstream and downstream pruning. Given two points,
we first perform downstream pruning from the earlier point until the later point timestamp.
Second, from the later point we perform upstream pruning until the timestamp of the early
point. Then we inspect the two resulting subgraphs to identify the intersection set, called
meeting nodes (FindMnodes() in Algorithm 2). Along with pruning, each point maintains the
tags of its parent and ancestor nodes. Finally, we use the tags of meeting nodes to construct
the full paths (i.e., SPS) (RecoverPaths() in Algorithm 2). The remaining causalities along
the paths will be captured by the selective DIFT.
Data Interference in Memory Space
We further look into the system call sequence of each process execution. We observe that
for object-to-object causality, the inbound object can be causally related to the outbound
object only if their existence ranges overlap in the process memory space. We call these
overlaps “interferences,” which fortunately can be identified in the system call sequence. By
examining interference situations, we skip performing DIFT in the case of non-interference.
For example, in Figure 3.3, the outbound “report.doc” file (node B) has no interference with
the inbound “contract1.csv” file (node D) because the read takes place after the write.
Therefore, the interference analysis rules out the necessity of doing DIFT for the “TextEditor”
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Algorithm 2 Information Flow Based Graph Pruning
Require: up_nodes, down_nodes
function REGIST_INTERFERENCE(ne,na)
if ne ∈ {read, recv} then
if ne.timestamp ≤ na.timestamp then
add_interference(ne,nd)
else if ne ∈ {write, send} then




for node ∈ ngb_nodes do
if Direction = UP then
if TPoint.type = Process then
if node /∈ {read, recv} then
continue
else if TPoint.type ∈ {File,Host} then





else if Direction = DOWN then
if TPoint.type = Process then
if node /∈ {write, send} then
continue
else if TPoint.type ∈ {File,Host} then





process (node P2). Meanwhile, the “Gzip” program (node P3) is an positive interference
example, as both of the two upstream files (“contract2.pdf” (node E) and “loss.pdf” (node
F)) once shared memory space with the outbound “errors.zip” file (node C).
It is this interference situation in the memory space that leads to possible data propagation
(exchange between objects), which we later identify using DIFT. By identifying the exact
interference situation of each process execution, we become aware of the part of the
execution that requires fine-grained refinement as well as a source and a sink. In the DIFT,
we fast-forward the replay to the start of interference (e.g., a read syscall), and then early-
terminate at the sink. Each entry of interference includes the process, the first syscall that
reads the inbound file, the last syscall that writes to the outbound file, the inbound file,
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and the outbound file. To keep track of ordering, the timestamps of inbound and outbound
syscalls are logged. As it is most effective when interference occurs at a late execution time
or when it is short, we can skip most of DIFT. In §3.7 we show how to classify associated
files with interference into groups so that one pass of DIFT is able to resolve all of the
causalities in the group.
3.7 Selective Causality Refining
To further refine the graph and obtain fine-grained level causalities, we perform selective
data tracking on top of the SPS. We re-compute (i.e., replay) user-space executions while
performing taint analysis to determine causality in the interference cases (§3.6.2). Our
approach entails tainting the bytes loaded to the memory space and tracking the propagation
of the tainted bytes at the level of instruction execution. DIFT (or “taint analysis”) has
been implemented in previous work [32, 33, 11, 12]. We port open-source taint engines to
develop our own taint engine that supports object-object, object-process, and process-process
causalities (§3.7.1).
Because taint analysis is costly, we find that even offline analysis becomes impractical if
we naively perform taint tracking on every process group. Therefore, we aim to minimize
the cost of analysis by performing directional taint tracking in each group, orchestrating
process groups for information flow-based tainting for upstream and downstream analyses,
and reusing the taint results to avoid duplicate tainting. RAIN is able to track fine-grained
causality along the upstream and downstream paths in the SPS according to the causality
results in every branch. For each process group we locate the exact target of taint tracking
according to the data interference of the presence of objects in the memory space (§3.6).
We present how we conduct taint in every process group in §3.7.1 and how we orchestrate
tracking across process groups in §3.7.2.
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3.7.1 Directional Intra-process Tainting
According to the tainting targets determined in the SPS, RAIN performs DIFT starting from
the source of interference (§3.6.2) and ending at the sink in every replay of the process
execution. In our current prototype we determine causality to occur as long as any byte of
the inbound object is propagated to the outbound object.
Interference Aggregation
Instead of running taint tracking on every pair of interferences, we aggregate them so
they can be resolved in a single pass of taint tracking. This spares duplicate taints from
propagating in the same execution trace. Aggregation takes place in the same process
group. Suppose n interferences in the process group are related to the analysis request. We
aggregate them by starting from the earliest interference and ending at the latest one. Then
we run the taint tracking one time instead of n times. For example, in Figure 3.3, inside the
P3 process, we aggregate the interference of files E and C via read and write, and files F
and C via mmap, write because they belong to the same process P3 in the SPS. Thus we can
resolve the causalities within them in one pass of tainting. When the tainting is performed it
starts from the read syscall until the write syscall with the tagging of both E and F files as
sources.
Replay and Taint Propagation
To allow taint tracking to work independently from a replayed execution, we adopt the
analysis compensation technique from [66], which is able to differentiate the executions
of Intel Pin from that of the program. First, no syscall made by Pin will be mixed by the
recorded syscalls because the replayer is aware of their occurrences (i.e., it can differentiate
between the two). Second, for memory space separation, the record log is scanned for
any memory allocations. They will be allocated first so the replayed execution will not be
affected by Pin.
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Our DIFT engine is a set of Pin tools that reuses the open-source libdft [33], Dytan [32],
and dtracker [45] projects for tracking object-object causality. The taint tags propagate
on both data and control flow dependencies. Data dependency is tracked by monitoring
the read/write memory operations at the instruction level between memories and registers,
and control flow dependency comes from indirect branch dependency and incurs a higher
overhead. We also implement tools that track object-process, process-process causalities.
For cases in which object-process causality cannot be captured by the execve syscall, we
taint track the data propagations and their impact on the control flow. We determine this
causality when the return address or the eip register is tainted by the data of an input
object (similar to [30]), which unveils typical memory corruption exploits that hijack the
control flow. For the shared memory case in the process-process causality, we monitor
shared memory-related syscalls (e.g., shmget and mmap) to map the shared memory among
processes so that we are able to track the memory operation of a data transfer from a private
memory space of one process (e.g., stack and heap) to the shared memory space, and then to
the other processes. Additionally, we track the data propagation from an inbound object in
one process to an outbound object in another process via shared memory.
3.7.2 Orchestrating Taintings Across Processes
In this section, we present how we perform taint tracking across processes according to
the SPS. We regard taint tracking inside the process as a block function. To efficiently
accomplish DIFT, we apply optimization techniques that minimize the tainting workloads.
Specifically we introduce two methods of handling tainting in the upstream and downstream
directions. Finally, we present how we refine causality paths for a point-to-point analysis by
verifying the coarse-grained paths one-by-one and reusing the previous results cumulatively.
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Downstream Refinement
Downstream refinement is capable of accurately identifying the impact of an attack, which is
critical in both forensic analysis and intrusion recovery. Compared to conventional intrusion
recovery approaches (e.g., Retro [58] and Dare [67]), RAIN produces accurate causality
between involved files so the recovery can be performed only in files with true causality
which eliminates false positives; otherwise innocent processes will be “re-executed.”
Recall that when generating the SPS, RAIN also produces a pool of interference entries
(§3.6.2) in which potential causalities exist. Starting from a designated point (e.g., a file), we
identify the process and interference related to this point and then resolve the fine-grained
causality. In the case of object-object causality, we run DIFT on the associated process
and determine the outbound object(s) with true causality. From that object, we repeat the
procedure to determine further causally related downstream objects bounded by the SPSs.
Take, for example, the data-tampering case in the motivating attack. The SPS reports
that the tampered spreadsheet file “agreement.csv” has been later read by the auto-budget
script which produces the budget and production plan files. More interestingly, the budget
file is then used by the document editor which generates a season report. The triggering
point in this case is the tampered spreadsheet file. Further interference entries with the file
as inbound object will be pinpointed and taint tracking will be performed. We consider
this interference situation an entry. Then we conduct taint analysis on the first (closest hop)
process to identify the true outbound object and move further downstream making the found
outbound object inbound object. As a result, we are able to repeatedly identify the exact
downstream causalities and insert them into the provenance graph.
Upstream Refinement
Upstream refinement also begins at the triggering point, but proceeds in the reverse order
of the execution time. The SPS appears in an acyclic-directed graph shape with the latest
point being the triggering point (e.g., the file leaked by the compromised FTP extension).
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To identify the leaked file and its provenance, we locate the associated process in the SPS.
The taint tracking on the replay of the process execution determines the real causal parents
so the next rounds of taint tracking are performed only at these parent files. Taint tracking
continues recursively until it hits a boundary advised by the SPS. At each branch where
multiple inbound objects exist, refinement continues only on the true inbound object(s) and
ensures that they are outbound objects for the next round of tainting.
In Figure 3.3, from the attacker’s site, we begin running upstream refinement performing
tainting at P1 (i.e., the Firefox session). We find that although the “report.doc” file (node
B) and the “errors.zip” file (node C) are both inbound, only file C is causally related to the
attacker’s controlled host (node A). We drop file B and continue refinement on the branch
from file C. Again we find that “Gzip” (node P3) has input files “contract2.pdf” (node E)
and “loss.csv” (node F), but only file F exhibits causality with file C, so we continue along
the F branch. As a result, we eliminate the unnecessary workload of tainting dead branches
that do not reach the triggering point.
Extending Causality Across Processes. As an optional feature, we keep track of the
causality across processes (e.g., in Figure 3.3, file F to site A). We maintain a shadow
tagging file for each file that is accessed by more than one process. This tagging file keeps
track of the source tag of every byte in the file so that RAIN can track the causality between
two separate files in different processes. For example, in Figure 3.3, the shadow tagging file
of file C is generated when tainting is performed on P3. The tagging file contains the bytes
with causality between files E and F. When we replay and taint track P1, we refer to the
tagging of file C and acknowledge that the leaked data includes both files C and F because
part of the contents of C originated from file F. Accompanied by upstream refinement, RAIN
constitutes the result of this Point-to-Upstream analysis that file C has been leaked to the
attacker while certain leaked contents of C originate from F. In our current prototype, this
feature is optional and on-demand as it incurs higher tainting overhead. Note that tracking




Recall that causality may have been included within the SPS (§3.6.2). With the help of
the SPS, heavy DIFT is applied to verify the data flow on the path where the fine-grained
causalities (e.g., object-object) occur. This filters out many unrelated branches that would
have incurred high analysis overhead.
Based on the processes on each path in the SPS, we replay and perform taint tracking on
the process groups in the path to verify true causality. From the start to end points along the
path, each process group is replayed and taint tracking performed on the specific interference
between the inbound and outbound system calls. The inbound object is tagged and the
running of the process propagates the tags and monitors whether it hits the outbound object.
If it does, verification continues. Otherwise, it terminates and returns a negative result. The
verification runs until an end point. If all interferences along the path are positive, we refer to
the path as “causality positive.” At the end, the refinement returns all the causality-positive
paths.
The verification procedure is optimized by reusing the taint results for each group. In
the implementation, we store the causality between specific inbound and outbound files in
a database. In the remaining verifications, we start by searching the database for existing
causality facts. Then we reuse them if possible without performing the same taint tracking
again. Because we reuse the results, taint verification takes less time as we verify more paths.
Particularly for the point-to-point case, the taint tracking in every process group is optionally
run in parallel to accelerate the analysis if more computing resources are available. As
every process group is independently recorded and independently replay-able, we tag every
process group with a symbolic tag and will resolve the tag propagation with real tags. The
use of more resources with less time consumption represents the cost of this optimization.
In this case, refinement time decreases to the level of the longest DIFT.
33
Table 3.2: Implementation complexity.
Host Module LoC
Target host
Kernel Module 2,200 C (Diff)
Trace Logistics 1,100 C
Analysis host
Provenance Graph 6,800 C++
Trigger/Prune 1,100 Python
Selective Refinement 900 Python
DIFT Pin tools 3,500 C/C++ (Diff)
3.8 Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented a prototype of RAIN in Linux. In the kernel module of the target host, we
implemented the system logging logic with comprehensive semantics to build the provenance
graph and to support whole-system recording. On the analysis host, we implemented the
construction of the provenance graph and trigger/prune methods as well as DIFT that support
object-object, object-process, and process-process causalities on top of [33, 32, 45]. The
complexity of implementation is summarized in Table 3.2. We plan to release the source
code of RAIN.
Our evaluation addresses the following questions:
• How well does RAIN detect various attack scenarios (§3.8.1, §3.8.1)?
• How accurately does RAIN prune and refine provenance graphs (§3.8.1)?
• How much overhead associated with analysis, runtime, and storage does RAIN have
(§3.8.2)?
In our evaluation environment, we set up the target and analysis host individually on two
bare-metal machines both powered by Intel Xeon(R) CPU W3565 3.2GHz; the target host
has an 8GB RAM and 512GB hard drive, and the analysis host has a 32GB RAM and 2TB




Using various attack scenarios, including the motivating example, we evaluate the accuracy
gains and conduct a set of red team exercises from the DARPA Transparent Computing
program [47].
Motivating Example
We demonstrate the end-to-end procedure and efficacy of RAIN at detecting and analyzing
the motivating attack example (§3.1). The attack exploits the FireFtp addon of Firefox to
steal a user’s data and tamper with downloaded files. At the triggering pinpoint phase of the
analysis, the security team of the company was notified that an originally trustworthy site
(e.g., white-listed in the firewall policy) was compromised for one week until they confirmed
and recovered from the leakage of critical contract details (i.e., External Signal in §3.6.1).
In addition, they received complaints from the audit team about abnormal changes in the
numbers in a spreadsheet file when they compared the downloaded spreadsheet file to the
original one stored in the archive (i.e., Customized Comparison in §3.6.1). Because of the
dependency between documents, the team was also concerned about the impact on other
files. With these triggering points, the security team, to accurately determine what was
stolen and what was affected by the attack, queried RAIN for the exact causalities around
the compromised site and suspicious files.
To find out what was leaked to the attacker’s controlled site, RAIN performs a “Point-to-
Upstream” analysis from the site to identify the leaked data. First, RAIN extracts the SPS
from the provenance graph by pruning off unrelated nodes and edges and downsizes it to
around 20% of the original provenance graph. Then RAIN performs refinement on some
of of the process executions, including the Firefox process which communicates with the
site. After performing selective refinement, RAIN determines that even though multiple
files were accessed, only “ctct1.csv” was leaked. The refinement further reduces the size of










































(a) NetRecon (b) ScreenGrab (c) CameraGrab
Figure 3.4: Simplified provenance graph with highlighted accurate causality path
malicious site (Figure 3.3). RAIN also locates the set of files affected by the tampered file
as it is used by a finance program to generate reports and other documents. The accurate
results generated by RAIN ensure that the company is aware of the scope of data leakage
and the impact of the data tampering without panicking or having to carry out unnecessary
recovery efforts.
TC Red Team Exercise
We use the set of attack scenarios from the red team exercise of the Transparent Computing
(TC) program [47] to continue our evaluation. The attack first installs an implant-core on
the victim’s system via social engineering (e.g., email). After installation, the implant-core
communicates with the attacker’s host (e.g., the C&C server) and receives and performs
future attack tasks. We use four unit attack examples (i.e., NetRecon, ScreenGrab, Cam-
eraGrab, and AudioGrab) to demonstrate how RAIN works and what amount of accurate
causality is generated.
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Table 3.3: Incremental evolvement with pruning and refining.
Analysis Stages Coarse Level Pruning Fine Level Refinement False Positive Rate
Items Nodes/Edges Nodes/Edges Paths Coarse% Fine% REDUC%
Attacks Analysis ProvGraph SPS Prune% Result Added% SPS Result Added%
A(O-Up)
19,634/135,474
3,024/26,749 15.4%/19.7% 342/2,621 11.3%/9.8% - - - 67.0% 0.0% 100.0%
MotivExp A(O-Dn) 1,822/13,981 9.3%/10.3% 46/336 2.5%/2.4% - - - 55.6% 0.0% 100.0%
(3h02m) A(O-O) 389/733 1.9%/0.5% 98/222 25.2%/20.2% 51 19 37.3% 69.1% 0.0% 100.0%
A(O-Up)
12,892/86,376
2,394/17,691 18.5%/20.5% 198/210 8.3%/11.9% - - - 70.3% 23.4% 66.8%
NetRecon A(P-Dn) 1,234/8,880 9.6%/10.3% 86/799 7.7%/9.0% - - - 84.7% 13.0% 84.7%
(2h38m) A(O-O) 147/287 1.1%/0.3% 34/66 23.2%/23.0% 12 4 33.3% 66.6% 0.0% 100.0%
A(P-Up)
7,327/46,367
1,348/9,189 18.4%/19.8% 156/952 8.2%/7.9% - - - 90.5% 0.0% 100.0%
ScreenGrab A(O-Dn) 895/4,877 12.2%/10.5% 72/351 8.1%/7.2% - - - 82.1% 0.0% 100.0%
(1h13m) A(O-O) 21/30 0.28%/0.07% 5/4 23.8%/13.3% 9 5 55.5% 77.4% 0.0% 100.0%
A(P-Up)
5,308/33,440
1,603/11,102 30.2%/33.2% 96/477 6.0%/4.3% - - - 32.0% 0.0% 100.0%
CameraGrab A(O-Dn) 589/3,317 11.0%/9.9% 59/70 10.5%/2.1% - - - 29.8% 0.0% 100.0%
(39m) A(O-P) 101/268 1.9%/0.8% 24/59 24.1%/22.0% 9 7 77.7% 44.2% 0.0% 100.0%
A(O-Up)
4,909/33,382
992/6,846 20.2%/20.5% 49/232 4.9%3.4% - - - 39.7% 0.0% 100.0%
AudioGrab A(P-Dn) 415/3,394 8.5%/10.1% 31/161 7.4%/4.7% - - - 48.2% 0.0% 100.0%
(30m) A(P-P) 230/1,392 4.7%/4.2% 84/519 36.5%/37.3% 22 18 81.8% 29.3% 0.0% 100.0%
3
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Table 3.4: Analysis request details.
Schemes Analysis 1st Point 2nd Point Time (s)
MotivExp
A(O-Up) AttkSvr - -
A(O-Dn) TmpedFile1 - -
A(O-O) CtctA.csv AttkSvr 305
NetRecon
A(O-Up) NR.log - -
A(P-Dn) NetScan - -
A(O-O) AttkSvr NR.log 94
ScreenGrab
A(P-Up) ScrnGrab - -
A(O-Dn) X11Svr - -
A(O-O) X11Svr AttkSvr 68
CameraGrab
A(P-Up) ImpCore - -
A(O-Dn) CmrGrab(file) - -
A(O-P) CmrGrab(file) ImpCore 38
AudioGrab
A(O-Up) AttkSvr - -
A(P-Dn) Firefox - -
A(P-P) Firefox RptGen 418
NetRecon. First, the implant-core clones a process called NetRecon which collects network
configuration information that it saves to a temporary file. Second, the implant-core clones
another process that scans neighboring hosts based on network configuration information.
The triggering analysis finds suspicious collecting behavior by spotting a downloaded file
conducting a series of ioctl requests SIOCGIFHWADDR and SIOCGIFBRDADDR. The results
of the “point-to-downstream” analysis shows that the cloned process reads the temporary
file and tries to connect other internal hosts that are determined by the temporary file. In
addition, the point-to-point analysis between the “NetRecon.log” and neighboring hosts
shows the effectiveness of RAIN involving control flow dependency. Figure 3.4(a) highlights
the key causality between eth0 and another neighbor host. It shows a simplified provenance
graph with highlighted accurate causality path (red dotted line for object-object causality and
blue dotted line for object-process causality; the nodes on the path are colored accordingly).
Notations: (a) A/B: eth0/eth1; C: /tmp/netrecon.log; D/E/F: internal hosts; P1: ImplantCore;
P2: NetReCon; P3: Scanner. (b) A: attacker server; B/C/D: screen.png; E: /tmp/.X11-
unix/X0; P1: ImplantCore; P2: ScreenGrab. (c) A: /dev/video; B: malicious site that
contains CameraGrab payload; C/D: pictures; E: attacker server; P1: Firefox browser; P2:
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ImplantCore. Additionally, we perform other types of analyses and list the incremental
results in Table 3.3. The Nodes/Edges column of provenance graph shows the whole system
executions during this period; Nodes/Edges of SPS tells the size of pruned data in different
queries; Prune% gives the portion of pruned data to the original one; In the fine-level
refinement stage, we show the number of nodes and the number of added causality edges in
Nodes/Edges, along with the Added% rate. Particularly for the “Point-to-Point” analysis,
the Paths column tells the number of paths in the SPS and the numbers after refinement.
Column FP-Coarse%, FP-Fine%, and REDUC% indicate the false positive rate with
coarse-level provenance data, with RAIN refinement, and the reduction percentage.
ScreenGrab. The implant-core downloads a “ScreenGrab” program that occasionally
captures the screenshot of the victim’s desktop and selects certain shots to send to the
attacker’s server. While the attack occurs, the user performs various background desktop
actions such as web browsing. Our triggering analysis learns that a site is controlled by
the attacker. Starting from the malicious site, RAIN conducts an upstream analysis in order
to identify a causal relationship with the triggering point. It begins by extracting the SPS
from the provenance graph, and then performs a fine-grained analysis to refine the SPS to
obtain an accurate causality subgraph. We can see the executable ScreenGrab has multiple
inbound traffic from the X11 server (i.e., via Unix domain socket /tmp/.X11-unix/X0)
and outbound traffic to a file. Then the implant-core sends this file to the attacker’s host.
RAIN is able to identify exactly which file is sent. We highlight the SPS with refined
causality in Figure 3.4(b) in red.
CameraGrab and AudioGrab. The victim’s Firefox browser is exploited with a zero-day
exploit and its control-flow is hijacked to the CameraGrab and AudioGrab payloads. The
exploited browser then uses a camera and a microphone to spy on the user’s behavior and
saves it in images and audio files respectively. Finally, the implant-core selects certain files
and sends them to the attacker server. During this process, the user sometimes finds that
the LED light on the camera is on despite having no intention of using the camera. The
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Table 3.5: Analysis cost comparison.
Time (s) #Taint
Attack Analysis PruT RefiT T(P+R) RAIN None Fraction%
MotivExp A(O-O) 759 2,321 3,080 34 720 4.7%
NetRecon A(O-O) 140 1,320 1,460 13 138 9.4%
ScreenGrab A(O-O) 127 253 380 5 99 5.0%
CameraGrab A(O-P) 326 757 1,083 19 141 13.4%
AudioGrab A(P-P) 301 687 988 11 310 3.5%
triggering point is ioctl syscalls which communicates with the device. To determine the
root cause, we perform “point-to-upstream” analysis to check for the specific object-process
causality that causes the exploitation of Firefox. The results (Figure 3.4(c)) indicate a
causality between the CameraGrab payload and the browser as the instruction pointer of
Firefox goes to the payload. A further check of Firefox reveals that the main page has
become a malicious site, so the browser is exploited every time it is started.
Pruning and refinement
In general, the resulting subgraph is substantially smaller than the global graph (> 90%) as
well as the SPS that is computed by the coarse-level analysis. More importantly, because of
DIFT, the analysis reveals the true causalities. We analyzed several attack scenarios and
summarize their incremental pruning and refinement results in Table 3.3 (the specifics of the
analysis requests are listed in Table 3.4). In particular, we list the false positive rates using
coarse-level data with RAIN refinement and the reduction ratio. The potential causalities
(denominator) are counted according to the “dependency explosion” [23] definition in which
each output is assumed to depend on all the earlier inputs. With RAIN, most false positives
in the provenance graph are eliminated (i.e., a 100% reduction), but we also encountered
two cases in which false positives remained after refinement. When we took a closer look at
the DIFT, we observed the “over-tainting” situation that occurs during control flow-based
propagation which is a known limitation of DIFT. In general, RAIN effectively improves the




To fairly examine the time duration and tainting workload induced by RAIN, we evaluate the
cost of analysis using bounded point-to-point queries. In Table 3.5, we first show the time
duration for RAIN to prune (column PruT) and refine (RefiT) the data using the point-to-
point refinement in parallel (i.e., the longest duration among instances of tainting). The PruT
column lists the time used to extract the subgraph prior to fine-grained refinement. RefiT
shows the time it takes to selectively refine causality using taint analysis; T(P+R) represents
the total analysis time and #Taint-RAIN how many process groups are replayed and taint
tracked with the point-to-point refinement algorithm (§3.7.2); #Taint-None provides the
number of process groups to be replayed and tainted between the two time points without
reachability and selective DIFT algorithms. The average fraction ratio is 5.8%.
We then evaluate the performance of the reachability analysis and selective DIFT. We
first list the number of all of the process groups between the two points in the None column.
If one attempted to refine the causalities without applying the pruning (§3.6) or the selective
DIFT algorithms (§3.7), this number would represent the load. It would also reflect the
user-land part of the taint workload in full-system DIFT systems (e.g., [44, 34]). The number
of tainting instances that RAIN performs for the same task is listed in the RAIN column.
We find that our algorithm is effective, significantly reducing the tainting workload to a
fraction of 5.8% on average. Note that we focus on the factual tainting workload the analysis
must take, rather than the total time. After all, one can parallelize the workload on multiple
machines to reduce time consumption.
Runtime Performance
We evaluate the runtime performance of RAIN with SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks listed in
Figure 3.5. The runtime overhead of only running system logging is represented by the
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Figure 3.5: Normalized runtime performance with SPEC CPU 2006.
Figure 3.6: Normalized runtime performance with I/O intensive applications.
green bars for various testing items. The overhead of logging plus recording is listed in the
blue bars. The geometric mean of runtime overhead in a logging+recording mode is 3.22%.
Besides the CPU intensive benchmark, we also run I/O intensive applications as RAIN
hooks system calls and caches file or a network I/O. We compare the runtime performance
of four applications: copying the Linux kernel 3.5.0 archive with cp, downloading a 450MB
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Figure 3.7: Normalized runtime performance (logging+recording) with SPLASH-3 multi-core bench-
mark (4-core CPU). OCEAN-C: contiguous; OCEAN-N: non-contiguous; WATER-N: nsquared;
WATER-S: spatial.
Table 3.6: Storage cost (MB).
Storage usage (MB)
Case Log Record Total
MotivExp 45.6 155 201
NetRecon 29 137.1 166
ScreenGrab 16.6 97.3 114
CameraGrab 15.8 89.2 105
AudioGrab 18.2 115.4 133
Libc compiliation 327 413 740
video mp4 file from a local area network with wget, compiling the eglibc-2.15 library,
and loading cnn.com in Firefox. Figure 3.6 illustrates the normalized overhead breakdown
in terms of system logging and full mode (logging+recording). In these I/O intensive cases,
RAIN incurs no more than 50% overhead.
To evaluate the runtime performance of RAIN in multi-core machines, we run the
SPLASH-3 [68] multi-core benchmark with a 4-core CPU and summarize the results in
Figure 3.7. The geometric mean of runtime overhead (logging+recording) is 5.35%, and
RAIN is able to faithfully replay all the benchmarks without divergence.
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Storage Cost in Scenarios
We measure the storage cost of RAIN with the scenarios used in §3.8.1 and a high workload
case (i.e., compiling eglibc-2.15), the results of which are summarized in Table 3.6. The
compiled libc is around 235MB, which is smaller than either the system or record log.
This is because RAIN not only cached the target files that were built but also the temporary
files generated during the compiling. Even though the log size is larger than the resulting
size of compilation, it shows RAIN’s ability to re-construct (and analyze) a transient state of
a complex program execution (we presented the storage footprint of daily usage in §3.4.3).
3.9 Limitations and Discussion
This section presents the limitations of RAIN and directions of future work. One limitation
of RAIN is that it is a kernel-based system. It is able to record, replay, and analyze the
activities of user-level processes but unable to monitor the kernel activities because it trusts
the kernel. If the kernel is compromised, RAIN is no longer able to create reliable provenance
data. Thus if such an incident ever occurred, RAIN could use kernel-integrity monitoring
techniques [51, 52, 53, 54, 55] that detect and filter out misinformation. In the future, we will
port RAIN to a hypervisor that records and replays kernel activities while reducing attack
surfaces. This approach will allow RAIN to support commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) OSes
(e.g., Windows). In addition, the semantic information of RAIN poses a limitation because
it is less comprehensive than that of source-code-instrumentation-based approaches [23,
16] since it assumes no assistance from software developers (i.e., annotation). We believe
that these approaches are orthogonal: while RAIN is successful at extracting fine-grained
information from COTS programs or unknown binaries (e.g., malware), instrumentation-
based approaches are effective at collecting semantically rich information from supportive
programs. Another limitation is the over-tainting issue that we encountered, particularly
when dealing with control flow-based propagation. This problem, which has always plagued
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Dytan [32] × Runtime Inlined High High/High
DataTracker [45] × Runtime Inlined High High/High
Panorama [34] × Runtime Inlined High High/High
ShadowReplica [11] × Runtime Inlined High Low/High
Taintpipe [12] × Runtime Inlined High Low/High
Panda [43, 69] × Replay Inlined High High/High
Arnold [9] × Replay Inlined Low High/High
RAIN × Replay Inlined Low High/High
Jetstream [37] × Replay Inlined Low Low/High
TaintExchange [70] ✓ Runtime Inlined High High/High
Cloudfence [71] ✓ Runtime Inlined High High/High
RTAG ✓ Replay Decoupled Low Low/Low
DIFT approaches needs to be addressed. Since RAIN relies on triggering analysis to initiate
a fine-grained analysis, it could either miss or delay the detection of some stealthier attacks
Further, faulty triggers could simply waste the time and energy resources of RAIN. To
solve this problem, we plan to develop an anomaly-based self-triggering mechanism that
automatically initiates a fine-grained analysis. Lastly, the storage overhead of RAIN is
greater than that of other systems such as ProTracer [16]. Unlike such systems, RAIN
records all kinds of system calls (§3.4.3) to support replay-able execution, so the additional
storage overhead appears to be unavoidable. We plan to explore a further reduction of
storage overhead, for example, by compression and deduplication.
3.10 Related Work
Full-system Provenance Logging. Full-system provenance logging is essential to de-
tecting complicated attacks. For example, Linux supports the Linux Audit system [18],
which records information about system events. PASS [19, 20] is a storage system that
automatically logs and maintains provenance data. SPADE [21] is a cross-platform sys-
tem that logs provenance data across distributed systems, and Linux provenance modules
(LPM) [22] is a generic framework that allows developers to write Linux security module
(LSM)-like modules that define custom provenance rules. In addition, ProTracer [16] is a
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lightweight provenance tracking system that supports system event logging and unit-level
taint propagation, which is based on BEEP [23]. To reducing logging workload, ProTracer
“taints” in order to keep track of the units, which fundamentally differs from the dynamic
instrumentation-based taint tracking that we apply. However, none of the systems provides
the instruction-level fine-grained provenance data that RAIN provides because they can-
not achieve one of their main goals—minimizing runtime overhead—should they provide
instruction-level provenance data. RecProv [72] relies on a user-level record and replay
technique to recover syscall-level provenance, but its replay does not perform instruction-
level instrumentation, so it provides no finer-grained causality. DataTracker [45] performs
taint tracking and provides fine-grained causality data on individual files, but because of
the high execution overhead of taint analysis, using it as an analysis system instead of a
production system is impractical. PROV-Tracer [44] is built on top of PANDA [43], which
can also provides instruction-level granularity. However, the QEMU emulator it bases on
is around 5× slower than a native execution. We summarize the comparisons between
RAIN and previous provenance systems in Table 3.7. We compare the existing systems and
RAIN in terms of provenance granularity, runtime overhead and requirement. “Workflow”
in the brackets is another mode that monitors user-land applications, but requires source
code instrumentation. RAIN achieves both efficient runtime and instruction level analysis
granularity while does not require source or binary instrumentation.
Network Provenance Systems. Network provenance systems [49, 50, 73, 74] focus
on tracking network-level provenance between computing hosts belonging to the same
distributed or enterprise network environment. Their main goal is to find faulty (or com-
promised) hosts that attempt to attack other hosts in the same network by monitoring and
analyzing network traffic, and to ascertain how the faulty hosts were compromised. Since
they focus on network traffic, system-level fine-grained provenance (e.g., CPU instruc-
tions that were executed) are beyond the scope of the work that proposed these systems.
Thus, RAIN is orthogonal to these network provenance systems such that both can be
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simultaneously used to fully cover intra- and inter-system provenance.
Replay-Based Decoupled Analysis. Unlike the deterministic replay technique that faith-
fully replays the previous execution (e.g., in [38, 39, 40, 41]), the replay-based decoupled
analysis technique enables sophisticated analysis during replay. Arnold [9] is a state-of-the-
art record-and-replay system supporting decoupled analysis during replay. The two main
advantages of Arnold over two similar systems, Aftersight [42] and PANDA [43], are 1)
its minimal recording overhead and 2) its process-group-wise replay with Intel Pin. These
advantages stem from the implementation of Arnold inside the Linux kernel. By contrast,
Aftersight is based on both a VMWare hypervisor (record) and QEMU (replay), and PANDA
is purely based on QEMU. The main disadvantage of Arnold is that, unlike the other two
systems, it is built inside the kernel, so it cannot record and replay the execution of the
kernel.
We choose Arnold [9] as the base system of RAIN mainly because of its efficiency.
Note that RAIN’s functionalities (e.g., full-system recording, provenance data generation,
reachability analysis, and refinable DIFT) are orthogonal to Arnold, so we can apply them
to other systems easily. In fact, we have PANDA-based RAIN, which provides the same
functionalities even though its recording overhead is excessive (five times as high) mainly
resulting from QEMU.
Decoupled Taint Analysis. Dynamic taint analysis [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35] is a well-known
technique for tracking the data flow from a source to a sink. Taint analysis is useful for
runtime security policy enforcement [30, 31], malware analysis [34], and privacy leakage
detection [35]. However, because of its excessive performance overhead (e.g., the overhead
of one state-of-the-art implementation, libdft [33], is six times as high), it is difficult to use
it in a general computing environment. To solve this performance problem, several studies
have proposed decoupled taint analysis techniques [11, 12, 36, 37]. The purpose of these
techniques is to run a target process with a CPU core while performing taint analysis for a
process with other idle CPU cores.
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3.11 Conclusion
We presented RAIN, a practical attack investigation system with runtime efficiency and
refinable granularity (from system call to instruction). By leveraging a record-and-replay
technique, RAIN achieves efficiency using graph-based analysis to prune out unrelated
executions, and it performs DIFT only on relevant executions to identify fine-grained
causality. We demonstrated RAIN’s effectiveness by applying it to an evaluation dataset to
perform a precise causality analysis of sophisticated attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
CROSS-HOST REFINABLE ATTACK INVESTIGATION
4.1 Introduction
Advanced attacks tend to involve multiple hosts to conceal real attackers and attack methods
by using command-and-control (C&C) channels or proxy servers. For example, in the
Operation Aurora [75] attack, a compromised victim’s machine connected to a C&C server
that resided in the stolen customers’ account, and exfiltrated proprietary source code from
the source code repositories. Gibler and Beddome demonstrated GitPwnd [13], an attack
that takes advantage of the git [76] synchronization mechanism to exfiltrate victim’s private
data through a public git server. Unlike common data exfiltration attacks that only involve a
victim host, GitPwnd leverages two hosts (victim’s host and public git server) to complete
the exfiltration.
Unfortunately, existing attack investigation systems, also known as provenance systems,
are inadequate to figure out the true origin and impact of cross-host attacks. Many prove-
nance analysis systems (such as [22, 16, 77]) are designed to monitor the system-call-level
or instruction-level events within each host while ignoring cross-host interactions. In con-
trast, network provenance systems [78, 49, 79] focus on the interaction between multiple
hosts, but, because they lack detailed system-level information, their analysis could result
in a dependency explosion problem [23, 77]. To fully understand the steps and end-to-end
information flow of a cross-host attack, it is necessary to collect accurate flow information
from individual hosts and correctly associate them to figure out the real dependency.
Extending existing provenance systems to investigate cross-host attacks is challenging
because problems of accuracy, performance, or both can be worse with multiple hosts.
Although collecting coarse-grained provenance information (e.g., system-call-level informa-
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tion) introduces negligible performance overhead, it cannot accurately track dependency
explosion and undefined program behaviors (e.g., memory corruption) even within a single
host. That is, if we associate the coarse-grained provenance information from different
hosts using another vague link (e.g., network session [78, 49, 79]), the result will contain
too many false dependencies. Fine-grained provenance information, (e.g., instruction-level
information from dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT)), is free from such accuracy
problems. However, it demands many additional computations and consumes huge memory,
which will increase according to the number of hosts. More seriously, existing cross-host
DIFT mechanisms piggyback metadata (i.e., tags) on network packets and associate them
during runtime [71, 70], which is another source of huge performance degradation.
To perform efficient and accurate information flow analysis in the investigation of
cross-host attacks, we propose a record-and-replay-based data flow tagging and tracking
system, called RTAG. Performing cross-host information flow analysis using a record-and-
replay approach introduces new challenges that cannot be easily addressed using existing
solutions [77, 9, 71, 70]: that is, long analysis time and huge memory consumption. First,
the communication between different hosts (e.g., through socket communication) introduces
information flows that require additional information and procedure for proper analysis.
Namely, the DIFT analysis requires transfer of the analysis data (i.e., tags) between the
hosts in a synchronized manner. Existing record-and-replay solutions have to serialize the
communication between hosts to transfer tags because no synchronization mechanism is
implemented, leading to longer than necessary analysis time. Second, because a number
of processes can run on multiple hosts under analysis, the memory requirement for DIFT
instances could become tremendous, especially when multiple processes on different hosts
interact with each other.
To overcome these two challenges, RTAG decouples the tag dependency (i.e., information
flow between hosts) from the analysis with tag overlay and tag switch techniques (§4.6),
and enables DIFT to be independent of any order imposed by the communication. This
50
new approach enables the DIFT analysis to happen for multiple processes on multiple
hosts in parallel leading to a more efficient analysis. Also, RTAG reduces the memory
consumption of the DIFT analysis by carefully designing the tag map data structure that
tracks the association between tags and associated values. Evaluation results show significant
improvement both in analysis time, decreased by 60%–90%, and memory costs, reduced by
up to 90%, with realistic cross-host attack scenarios including GitPwnd and SQL injection.
This work makes the following contributions:
• A tagging system that supports refinable cross-host investigation. RTAG solves
“tag dependency coupling,” a key challenge in using refinable investigation systems
for cross-host attack scenarios. RTAG decouples the tag dependency from the analysis
which spares the error-prone orchestrating effort on replayed DIFTs and enables DIFT
to be performed independently and in parallel.
• DIFT runtime optimization. RTAG improves the runtime performance of doing
DIFT tasks at replay time in terms of both time and memory. By performing DIFT
tasks in parallel, RTAG reduces the analysis time by over 60% in our experiments. By
allocating an optimal tag size for DIFT based on system-call-level reachability analy-
sis, RTAG also reduces the memory consumption of DIFT by up to 90% compared
with previous DIFT engines.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: §4.2 describes the background of the
techniques that supported RTAG’s realization. §4.3, §4.4, and §4.5 present the challenges, an
overview and the threat model of RTAG; §4.6 presents the design of RTAG; More specifically,
§4.6.1 describes the data structure of RTAG, §4.6.3 explains how RTAG facilitates the
independent DIFT; §4.6.4 describes how RTAG conducts tag switch for DIFT, and §4.6.6
presents the tag association module and how RTAG tracks the traffic of IPC. §4.7 gives
implementation details and the complexity. §4.8 presents the results of evaluation. §4.9
summarizes related work, and §4.10 concludes this chapter.
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4.2 Background
RTAG utilizes concepts from a variety of research areas. This section provides an overview
of these concepts needed to understand our system.
4.2.1 Execution Logging
Attack investigation systems most often rely on logged information to perform their analyses.
Different systems use different levels of granularity when logging information for their
analyses (e.g., system-call level versus instruction level) as the cost of collecting this
information changes based on the selected granularity level. A first category of systems [18,
80, 16, 22] collects information at a high-level of granularity (e.g., system-call level) and
generally have low runtime overhead. However, the information collected at this level of
granularity might affect the accuracy of their analyses as it does not always provide all
of the execution details. A second category of systems improves accuracy by analyzing
program executions at the instruction level [81, 32, 34]. These systems provide very accurate
results in their analyses. However, they introduce a runtime overhead that is not suitable for
production software. Finally, a third category of systems [77, 9] combines the benefits of
systems from the previous two categories using record and replay. These systems perform
high-level logging/analysis while recording the execution of programs and perform low-level
logging/analysis in a replayed execution of the programs. More specifically, RAIN logs
system call information about user-level processes using a kernel instrumentation approach.
The system then analyzes instructions in a replayed execution of the processes.
4.2.2 Record and Replay
Record and replay is a technique that aims to store information about the execution of a
software system (record phase) and use the stored information to re-execute the software
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of the serialized DIFTs and RTAG parallel DIFTs.
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states as the original execution (replay phase). Record and replay techniques can be grouped
under different categories based on the layer of the system in which they perform the
record-and-replay task. Some techniques perform record and replay by instrumenting
the execution of programs at the user level [40, 59, 82, 83, 84]. These techniques are
efficient in their replay phase as they can directly focus on the recorded information for the
specific program. However, these techniques either require program source or binary code
for instrumentation or have additional space requirements when recording executions of
communicating programs (especially through the file system) as the recorded information is
stored multiple times. The second category of techniques performs record and replay by
observing the behavior of the operating system. Techniques do so by either monitoring the
operating system through a hypervisor [85, 41, 42] or emulation [43]. These techniques
are efficient in storing the information about different executing programs. However, they
usually need to replay every program recorded even when only one program is of interest
for attack investigation. Finally, a third category of techniques uses an hybrid approach.
This category records information at the operating system level and replays the execution
leveraging user-level instrumentation [77, 9] (e.g., by hooking libc library) for multi-thread
applications. More specifically, Arnold [9] and RAIN reside inside the kernel of operating
system and record the non-deterministic inputs of executing programs. The replay task is
achieved by combining kernel instrumentation with user-level instrumentation so that replay
of a single program is possible.
4.2.3 Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) is a technique that analyzes the information
flowing within the execution of a program. This technique does so by: (1) marking with
tags the “interesting” values of a program, (2) propagating tags by processing instructions,
and (3) checking tags associated with values at specific points of the execution. There
are several instantiations of this technique [33, 32, 34, 11, 12, 37]. These instantiations
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can precisely determine whether two values of the program are related to each other or
not. However, because the technique needs to perform additional operations for every
executed instruction, that action generally introduce an overhead which makes it unsuitable
in production. Arnold [9] and RAIN make dynamic information flow tracking feasible by
moving the cost of the analysis away from the runtime using a record-and-replay approach
that performs DIFT only in the replayed execution. RAIN also improves the efficiency of
the analysis when considering an execution that involves multiple programs. RAIN does
so by: (1) maintaining a provenance graph that captures the high-level relations between
programs; (2) performing reachability analysis on the provenance to discard executions that
do not relate to the security task under consideration and instead pinpointing the part of
the execution where the data-dependency confusion exists (i.e., memory overlaps, called
interference); (3) performing DIFT only for interferences by replaying the execution and
fast-forwarding to that part.
4.3 Motivating Example and Challenges
In section, we describe the challenges of performing refinable attack investigation across
multiple hosts. We first present a motivating attack example (GitPwnd [13]) involving
multiple hosts in a data exfiltration; then, we present what challenges we face with currently
available methods.
4.3.1 The GitPwnd Attack
GitPwnd uses a popular versioning control tool git to perform malicious actions on a
victim’s host and sync the result to an attacker’s controlled host via a git server. Unlike
conventional data exfiltration attacks, this attack involves multiple hosts (i.e., a victim’s host
and the git server) to achieve the exfiltration. This attack evades an existing network-level
intrusion detection system, as the victim’s host does not have a direct interaction with any
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Figure 4.2: Visualized Pruned Provenance Graph and Tags.
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inside the developers’ network, as git operations are usually assumed to be benign. We
implement this attack using gitolite [86] at the server side and git at the client side.
The starting point of the attack is a malicious mirror of a popular git repository, which
includes a hooking script that clones a command-and-control (C&C) repository for future
communication. Whenever a developer (a victim host) happens to clone the malicious mirror,
the git client will automatically clone the C&C repository as well due to the hooking script.
The C&C repository includes agent and payload, whose executions will be triggered by a
certain git operation (e.g., git commit) by the developer. Their execution results are saved
and synced to the C&C repository. Note that the C&C repository shares the privilege of
the malicious mirror repository, so it also is white-listed by the developer’s host. Whenever
the C&C repository receives the exploit results (stored into objects), it shares the results
with the attacker’s host (via scp). More specifically, this git push involves three processes.
1) The git first forks an ssh process, handling the ssh session with the remote host, and
then 2) spawns another git pack process packing the related objects of the push. 3) The
pack process uses pipe to transfer the packed data to the ssh process. The communication
between the C&C repository and the attacker’s host is invisible to the victim. We visualize an
abbreviated pruned provenance subgraph of the attack in Figure 4.2(a). (a) is the simplified
provenance graph of the GitPwnd attack involving three hosts, of which the git client and
git server are monitored by RTAG. We use red rectangles to represent processes, blue
ovals for file objects, and pink ovals for out-of-scope remote host; we use directed edges to
represent the data flows and parent-child relations between processes. The tags with dashed
circles are the IPC tags for pipe and socket communication. (b) is the result of a backward
query from the attacker’s host, the data flow overlay; it appears to be a tree, giving the data
flow every step from the exfiltrated private key and /etc/passwd (excluding /etc/group)
to the attacker’s host, crossing three hosts.




Satisfying both the accuracy and the efficiency for cross-host data flow tracking are chal-
lenging. Existing provenance systems that support cross-host accurate data flow capturing
[71, 70] rely on performing DIFT at the runtime, which naturally propagates the tags from
the execution of a program to another host without losing any tags and their dependen-
cies. Unfortunately, such systems suffer from 10×–30× runtime overhead, making them
impractical in production systems. Instead, to ensure both runtime efficiency and accurate
data flow tracking, refinable systems [77, 9] record the execution of every process in the
system, and selectively replay some of them related to the attack with DIFT instrumentation.
However, existing refinable systems are subject to a tag-dependency challenge that requires
the replay and DIFT of every process to be performed in the same order as the recording if
a dependency exists in tags involved in different replayed processes. The enforcement of
the order requires the DIFT tasks to wait for their upstream DIFTs to update the tag values
that they depend on. Although the record-and-replay function can faithfully re-construct the
program states at replay time, it still takes non-trivial (and error-prone) efforts to serialize
and orchestrate the replays of different processes to re-establish the dependencies for tag
propagation between different hosts.
The tag-dependency challenge becomes outstanding when we aim to replay processes
on multiple hosts to investigate cross-host attacks. This is because the interactive two-way
communication (for the purpose of network or application-level protocol) demands the
replays to be paused and waiting iteratively for enforcing the same tag dependency as the
recording, which further lengthens the waiting time (i.e., analysis time consumption), and
increases the complexity of replay orchestration.
Let us look into one example of replay from the Gitpwnd attack [13] (detailed in §4.3.1)
for the communication between the client-side ssh and the server-side sshd in Figure 4.1(a).
We highlight the components of RTAG with dashed circles. (a) shows the serialized DIFT
for the ssh daemon on the server and the ssh client on another host, both of which follow
58
the tag dependencies same as those were recorded. (b) depicts that RTAG decouples the tag
dependency from the replays of processes by using the tag switch, allocation and association
techniques so that each process in the offline analysis can be performed independently. At
the server side, the replay of sshd needs to be paused to wait for the replay of ssh-client
at the client side to fulfill the propagation results in the tag map for the traffic. Furthermore,
this traffic will be used by sshd to respond to ssh as an ssh protocol response, which means
the replay of ssh needs to be paused and wait for sshd as well.
This challenge is exacerbated when many parties are involved in group communication.
For example, to enforce the tag dependencies for the operation of searching and downloading
a file from a peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing network (e.g., Gnutella [87]), we need to
orchestrate the replays of P2P clients on each node, in which case the approach becomes
infeasible particularly when we are faced with hundreds or thousands of nodes. §4.8 shows
the DIFT time cost and compares it with RTAG in Table 4.1.
To systematically overcome the tag-dependency challenge, we propose RTAG that
decouples the tag dependencies from the replays by using symbolized tags with optimal
size for each independent DIFT. We show RTAG effectively solves the challenge while
significantly speeding up DIFT tasks and reducing their memory consumption.
4.4 Overview
We propose a tagging system, RTAG, that decouples the tag dependency from the analysis
(i.e., DIFT tasks), which previously was inlined along with the program execution or its
replayed DIFT, and enables DIFT to be independent of any required order—allowing
performing DIFT for different processes on multiple hosts in parallel. Such independence
spares the complex enforcement of orders during the offline analysis. Note that our parallel
DIFT concerns inter-process (or host) DIFT, which is orthogonal to the intra-process parallel
DIFT techniques in [37, 12, 36].
RTAG maintains a tagging overlay on top of a conventional provenance graph, enabling
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independent and accurate tag management. First, when DIFT is to be performed, RTAG
uses a tag switch technique to interchange a global tag that is unique across hosts and a
local tag that is unique for a DIFT instance. Using a local tag for each DIFT disentangles
the coupling of tags shared by different DIFT tasks. After the DIFT is complete, RTAG
switches the local symbol back to its original global tag. Second, to ensure no tag as well
as their propagation to other tags is lost when the tag of a piece of data is updated more
than once, RTAG keeps track of each change (version) of the data according to system-wide
write operations. Each data version has its own tag(s) and each version of tag values can be
correctly propagated to other pieces of data. Figure 4.1(b) depicts how RTAG facilitates the
independent replay and DIFT for the cross-host ssh daemon and client example with the tag
overlay and a set of techniques (i.e., tag switch, allocation, and association).
RTAG not only speeds up the analysis by enabling independent DIFT, but also reduces
the memory consumption when DIFT is performed. We allocate local symbols of each
DIFT with the optimal symbol size that is sufficient to represent the entropy of data involved
in the memory overlap (i.e., “interference”) in each DIFT (§4.6.5). For tracking the data
communication across hosts, RTAG applies a tag association method (§4.6.6) to map the
data that are sent from one host and the ones that are received at another host at byte level,
which facilitates the identification of tag propagation across hosts.
4.5 Threat Model and Assumptions
In this section, we discuss our threat model and assumptions. The goal of our work is
to provide a system for refinable cross-host attack investigation through DIFT. This work
is under a threat model in which an adversary has a chance to gain remote access to a
network of hosts, and will attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data from the hosts or to propagate
misinformation (i.e., manipulate data) across the hosts. Our trusted computing base (TCB)
consists of the kernel in which RTAG is running, and the storage and network infrastructure
used by RTAG to analyze the information collected from the hosts under analysis. Our TCB
60
surface is similar to the one assumed by other studies [22, 16, 19, 77].
We make the following assumptions. First, attacks will happen only after RTAG is
initiated (for collecting the information about attacks from the beginning to the end). Note
that partial information about attacks can still be collected even if this assumption is not
in place. Second, attacks relying on hardware trojans and side/covert channels are outside
the scope of this work. Although RTAG does not yet consider these attacks, we believe a
record-and-replay approach has the potential to detect similar attacks as presented in related
work [56, 57]. Third, we assume that although an attacker could compromise the OS or
RTAG itself, the analysis for previous executions is still reliable. That is, we assume the
attacker cannot tamper with the data collected and stored from program executions of the
past. This can be realized by leveraging secure logging mechanisms [49, 50] or by managing
the provenance data in a remote analysis server. Finally, we assume that the attacker cannot
propagate misinformation by changing the payload of network packets while they are being
transferred between two hosts (i.e., there is no man-in-the-middle attack).
4.6 Tagging System
We present the design of RTAG tagging system in this section. First, we describe the design
of the tag overlay and how it represents and tracks the data provenance in the cross-host
scope §4.6.1. Second, in §4.6.2, we recall the reachability analysis from RAIN and how
it is extended for the cross-host case and benefits the tag allocation. Third, we explain
how RTAG decouples the tag dependencies from the replays (§4.6.3), and the tag switch
technique (§4.6.4). Fourth, we explain how we optimize the local tag size in pursuit of
memory cost reduction in the DIFT. Fifth, we describe how to associate tags in the cross-host
communication §4.6.6. Finally, we present the investigation query interface in §4.6.7.
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4.6.1 Representing Data Flow and Causality
To track the data flow between files and network flow across different hosts, we build the
model of tags as an overlay graph on top of an existing provenance graph (such as RAIN).
Within the overlay graph, RTAG associates globally unique tags with interesting files to
track their origin and flows at byte-level granuality. The tags allow RTAG to trace back to
the origin of a file including from a remote host and to track the impacts of a file in the
forward direction even to a remote host. With this capability, RTAG extends the coverage
of the refinable attack investigation [77] to multiple hosts. The provenance graph is still
necessary to track the data flows: 1) from a process to a file; 2) from a process to another
process; and 3) from a file to a process. An edge indicates an event between two nodes (e.g.,
a system call such as one that a process node reads from a file node).
In the overlay tag graph, each byte of a file corresponds to a tag key, which uniquely
identifies this byte. Each tag key is associated with a vector of origin value for this key
(i.e., this byte). By recursively retrieving the value of a key, one obtains all of the upstream
origins starting from this byte of data in a tree shape extending to the ones at a remote host.
Reversely, by recursively retrieving the tag key of a value, the analyst is able to find all the
impacts in a tree shape including the ones at a remote host (see Figure 4.2(b) as an example).
As we log the system-wide executions, RTAG needs to uniquely identify each byte
of data in the file system on each host as a “global tag.” For this requirement, RTAG
uses a physical hardware address (i.e., mac address) to identify a host, identifiers such as
inode, dev, crtime to identify a file, and an offset value to indicate the byte-level offset in
the file. For example, the physical hardware address (i.e., mac address) is 48 bits long. The
inode, dev, crtime are 64 bits, 32 bits, and 32 bits consecutively. The offset is 32-bits
long, which supports a file as large as 4GB. Thus, in total, the size of a global tag can be
208 bits.
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4.6.2 Cross-host Reachability Analysis
RTAG follows the design of reachability analysis in RAIN, and extends it to cope with
the cross-host scenarios. Given a starting point(s), RTAG prunes the original system-wide
provenance graph to extract a subgraph related to the designated attack investigation that
contains the causal relations between processes and file/network flow. RTAG relies on the
coarse-level data flows in this subgraph to maintain the tag overlay while performing tag
switch and optimal allocation. The reachability analysis first follows the time-based data
flow to understand the potential processes involved in the attack. Next, it captures the
memory overlap of file or network inputs/outputs inside each process and labels them as
“interference,” to be resolved by DIFT. With accurate interference information, the replay
and DIFT are fast forwarded to the beginning of the interference (e.g., a read syscall) and
early terminated at the end (e.g., a write syscall).
For the network communication crossing different hosts, RTAG links the data flow from
one host to another by identifying and monitoring the socket session. As we present in
§4.6.6, RTAG tracks the session by matching the IP and port pairing between two hosts.
RTAG further tracks the data transfer at byte level via socket communication for both TCP
and UDP protocols, which enables the extension of tag propagation across hosts. Unlike the
runtime DIFT system, RTAG has the comprehensive knowledge of source and sink from the
recorded file/network IO system-call trace, thus is able to allocate an optimal size of tag for
each individual DIFT task. We show in §4.6.5 that this optimization significantly reduces
the memory consumption of DIFT tasks. In addition, to avoid losing any intermediate tag
updates to the same resource performed by different processes, RTAG particularly monitors
the “overwrite” operations to the same offset of a file and tracks this versioning info, so it
accurately knows which version of the tag should be used in the propagation.
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4.6.3 Decoupling Tag Dependency
As a refinable provenance system, RTAG aims to perform DIFT at the offline replay time
without adding high overhead to the runtime of the program. The replay reconstructs the
same program status as the recording time by enforcing the recorded non-determinism to
the replay of process execution. The non-determinism includes the file, network, and IPC
inputs which are saved and maintained with a B-tree [9]. Such enforcement enables the
program to be faithfully replay-able at process level.
To extend this approach to capture the end-to-end data flow across multiple hosts,
we need to figure out how to coordinate replay programs on different hosts to track tag
dependencies between them. One possible method is decoupling tag dependencies from
each replay of the process, so it can be performed independently with no dependency on
other replays. We achieve the decoupling by using local (i.e., symbolized) tags for each
DIFT. Such symbolization needs to distinguish the change of a tag before and after the write
operation on it, and synchronize the change to other related tags as well. In other words,
RTAG needs to track the dynamic change of origin(s) of each tag after each IO operation
(i.e., multiple versions of the tag are tracked).
Let us illustrate with the data exfiltration in the Gitpwnd attack example in Figure 4.2(a).
The client-hook daemon keeps reading data from different files (e.g., /etc/passwd,
id_rsa) and saves them into a results file which is recycled over a period of time.
Meanwhile the git pack application copies from the results file whenever the victim
does git commit operation, and shares data with ssh via the pipe IPC, which will be
shipped off the host. To correctly differentiate the two data flows, id_rsa→results→pipe
and /etc/passwd→results→pipe, RTAG needs to maintain two versions of the tags for
results. The DIFT on client-hook stores the origin of results.v1 to be id_rsa, and
the origin of results.v2 to be /etc/passwd (circled with red dash line), while the DIFT
on git pack is able to discriminate the source of the IPC traffic git:ssh at offset 0 from
results.v1 and further from id_rsa, and the source of the IPC traffic at offset 1024 from
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results.v2 and further from /etc/passwd. Most importantly, now the client-hook and
git packDIFT tasks can be performed independently without losing intermediate tag values
because of the overwriting on results.
To facilitate the versioning, we append a 32-bit “version” field to indicate the version of
the data in the file with regards to the file IO operation. According to the sequential system-
call trace, the version is incremented at every event in which there is a write operation
against this certain byte (e.g., write(), writev()). In the case of memory mapped file
operation (e.g., mmap()), the version is incremented at the mmap() if the prot argument is
set to be PROT_WRITE. The version field is only used when this tag is included in the data
interference determined by the reachability analysis. We assign 32 bits for this field that can
pinpoint a file IO syscall in around 500 days based on our desktop experiment.
4.6.4 Switching Global and Local Tags
The entropy of the global tag defined in §4.6.1 is sufficient enough to identify a byte of a file
at a certain version across multiple hosts. However, using the global tag for each DIFT task
is a waste of memory because each DIFT task of RTAG only covers a process group such
that a local tag ensuring process-group-level uniqueness is enough. Thus, for each DIFT
task, we use a different tag size based on the entropy of its source symbols. RTAG switches
the tags from global to local before doing DIFT, and switches them back when the DIFT
is done. The tag for DIFT is local because it only needs to uniquely identify every byte of
the source in the current in-process DIFT, rather than identify a single byte of data across
multiple hosts.
Further, the number of sources in each DIFT depends on the reachability analysis result,
which is usually largely reduced by data pruning. In other words, the local tag size depends
on the interference situation. Therefore, the entropy for the local tag is much lower than
the global tag. For example, if the program reads only 10 bytes from a file marked as a
source in DIFT, in fact as low as four bits are sufficient to represent each of these bytes.
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Figure 4.3: Memory cost for tags in DIFT.
Compared against the global tag size (i.e., 208 bits §4.6.1), the switch brings 52× reduction
in tag size (in practice, the reduction can be as large as 26× capped by the compiler-enforced
byte-level granuality, which we discuss in detail in §4.7). Moreover, the tag size affects not
only the symbols for the source and sink, but also all the intermediate memory locations and
registers because the tags are copied, unioned, or updated along with the execution of each
instruction according to the propagation policy of DIFT. Therefore, the tag size literally
affects the memory cost of the whole tag map and tag switching significantly reduces the
overall memory cost of DIFT.
4.6.5 Optimal Local Tag Allocation
The runtime cost of DIFT is high, both in time and storage. DIFT usually takes 10×–30×
longer than the original execution because its instrumentation adds additional tag update
operations to each executed instruction. Recent studies [11, 12] alleviate this issue by
decoupling the instrumentation efforts from the runtime of the program. However, the
storage footprint of tag map, the data structure used by DIFT to maintain the tag propagation
status, can still be very high particularly when there are multiple (or many) sources.
The cost of tag map in DIFT depends on its supported type of tags and purpose. DIFT
engines such as Taintcheck [30], Taintgrind [88], and ShadowReplica [11] use a basic binary
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tag model for DIFT, which assigns a boolean “tainted” or “not tainted” for each source
of DIFT. It is able to tell whether the tainted data is propagated to the sink, which can
be used to alarm sensitive data leakage or control-flow hijacking. However, this model is
not flexible enough for the goal of RTAG, where the data dependency confusion it aims to
resolve involves multiple sources.
Dytan [32] and DataTracker [45] provide a customizable model for the data sources and
sinks. It allows the allocation of multiple tags to each addressable byte of data at the source
or sink. The tag model used by such systems is flexible, but the tag map used to maintain the
status of the taint propagation is “over-flexible” thus huge, which inhibits the deployment of
such a system in many resource restrained cases. As these systems assume to be running at
the runtime of a program, where no knowledge of the data at the source or sink is known
prior, they usually assign a fixed size for each tag such that they are confident it is safely
big enough. For example, DataTracker [45] uses 32 bits to identify an inbound file, and
another 32 bits to identify the offset of the data (totally 64 bits). The size is sufficient for
identifying every byte in a normal desktop. Dytan [32] represents whether one source is
tainted or not as one bit and stores all the bits in a bit vector as the tag. Thus the size of
each tag is linear to the number of sources, which can be huge in the case of a high number
of sources. Note that the tag map not only stores the tags for the source and sink, but all
the intermediate memory locations and registers as well. Since most implementations of
DIFT maintain the tag map in memory to pursue faster instrumentation, such high use of
memory has a possibility to cause the DIFT to crash before it is complete. This problem is
elevated when the scope of investigation extends to multiple hosts since the workload of
DIFT increases in proportion.
In contrast to the previous works that perform DIFT at the program runtime, RTAG is a
record-replay based system in which the knowledge of data source and sink is known to us
when we perform DIFT at replay time. In other words, we know which (bytes of) data need
to be involved in the DIFT. Thus, we can adjust the tag size based on the entropy of the data
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dependency confusion, rather than use a fixed-size tag. Figure 4.3 compares the memory
cost for tag map in different DIFT engines. The left (a) shows the size of each tag given
different numbers of symbols used in DIFT. The right (b) depicts the tagmap sizes based
on different sizes of memories being allocated with tags when 256 symbols are used in the
DIFT. RTAG local, global, DataTracker, and Dytan tags are compared. (a) shows that the
local tag of RTAG grows in logarithm while others are either linear or constant; (b) presents
the total tag map size under different sizes of memories that are tainted (i.e., allocated with
tags) where the memory cost introduced by RTAG is the lowest (by significant difference).
Before DIFT, RTAG computes the optimal local tag needed to mark the source and substitute
the global tag for the local one when a source is loaded to the memory space of the process
(e.g., via read() syscall). While performing DIFT, RTAG allocates the tags for intermediate
locations lazily when a memory location or register becomes tainted with some tag. When
the propagation arrives at a sink (e.g., via a write() syscall), RTAG replaces the local tag
with the original global one, and updates the tag value of the sink. We observe significant
memory cost reduction by applying this optimal tag allocation method (see §4.8.2).
4.6.6 Tag Association
In order to track the data flow between different hosts, we additionally hook the socket
handling of the operating kernel to enable the cross-host tagging. Prior studies adopt an
“out-of-band” method to track the data flow communication (e.g., [67, 71]). Though this
method is more straightforward when identifying and managing the tags across hosts, it
requires additional bookkeeping that incurs both complexity and overhead to the hosts.
In contrast, we propose an “in-band” method to track the data flow among hosts, which
particularly fits the system-level reachability analysis as well as the DIFT.
We design the cross-host tagging method based on the characteristics of the socket
protocols. Our current tagging scheme supports the two major types of protocols (i.e.,
TCP [89] and UDP [90]). For TCP, as the data stream delivery is guaranteed between the
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two hosts, we rely on the order of bytes in the TCP session between source and destination
to identify the data flow at byte level, which can be uniquely identified using a pair of IP
addresses and port numbers. Such tracking silently links the outbound traffic from the source
host with the inbound traffic at the destination host, which does not incur additional traffic.
Note that although TCP regulates the data stream order, the sender or receiver may run
different numbers of system calls in sending and receiving the data. For example, the sender
may perform five writev() system calls to send 10,000 bytes of data (2,000 bytes each
call), while the receiver may conduct 10 read() calls (1,000 bytes each call) to retrieve the
complete data. This is why counting sent or received bytes is necessary, instead of counting
the number of system calls.
In the case of UDP, since the data delivery is not guaranteed, some UDP packets could
be lost during transmission. So we cannot rely on the order of transferred bytes because
the destination host has no knowledge of which data are supposed to arrive and which have
been lost. To support UDP, we embed a small “cross-host” tag at each send related system
call by the source host, and parse the tag at receive related system calls by the destination
host. The tag is inserted into the beginning of the datagram as a part of the user datagram
before the checksum is calculated. If the datagram is transferred successfully, RTAG knows
a certain length of data goes from the source to the destination. If the destination host finds
the received datagram is broken, or totally lost, it will discard this datagram, hence RTAG is
also aware of the loss and erases this inbound data from the reachability analysis and DIFT.
As we will show in §4.8, the communication cost for TCP case is 0, while the cost for UDP
is also marginal in the benchmark measurement.
The cross-host tag represents the byte-level data in the socket communication between
two processes across hosts. Each tag key represents the data traffic in one socket session
using the source and destination process credentials, plus the offset that indicates the data at
byte level. For the uniqueness of session, we use the process identifier (pid) and the process
creation time (start_time in the task structure) to identify each process. The tag values
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represent the origin of the tag key, which is determined by the DIFT and updated to the
global tag map. The cross-host tags are also switched away before DIFT is performed and
restored afterward. For the hosts on which RTAG does not run, we treat them as a black box,
and identify them using the IP address and port number. The IP and port are retrieved from
the socket structure inside the kernel.
Handling IPC. RTAG tracks the data transfer of IPC communication between two processes
as well. For the IPC that uses system call as a controlling interface (e.g., pipe, and System
V IPC: message queues, semaphores), RTAG hooks these system calls to track the data
being transferred. When a process uses pipe to send data to the child process, RTAG
monitors the read and write system calls to track the transferred data in bytes. During
reachability analysis, we create tag keys to label every byte sent from the parent to the child.
The tag values are fulfilled by DIFT. For example, in Figure 4.2, although the git pack
and ssh processes have IPC dependency, RTAG is able to perform the replay and DIFT
independently on them since RTAG caches the inbound data reads from the pipe and feeds
them back during the replay. Also, by tracking the inode associated with the file descriptors
(rather than tracking pipe, dup(2) and child inheritance relationships), we identify the data
transmitted via the pipe at byte level and the processes at its two ends. RTAG implicitly
tracks the IPC based on shared memory. Instead of trapping the replay of a process for
each read from a shared memory, RTAG replays the processes having shared memory as
a group as RAIN and Arnold [9] do, so that the tag propagation of this shared memory is
performed within the process’ memory locations. No separate tag allocation is needed for
these processes.
4.6.7 Query Results
The query result will be returned after all the tag values of the interfering data are updated.
The result represents the data causalities of involved objects in a tree structure. For example,
in Figure 4.2, a backward query on the attacker’s controlled host 5.5.5.5:22 will return
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the tree-shape data flow overlay depicted in Figure 4.2(b), consisting of all the segments
of the flow from the key to all of its upstream origins. Also, a forward query returns every
segment of the data flow from the queried tag key to all of its impact(s). It relies on a
reversed map where the tag key and value are swapped to locate the downstream impact
from a file. For example, a forward query on the private key id_rsa on the client side returns
a flow: id_rsa→results.v1→objects→5.5.5.5:22. A point-to-point query gives the
detailed data flow between two nodes in the provenance graph by performing a forward and
backward query on these two nodes, then computing the intersection of the two resulting
trees.
4.7 Implementation
The implementation of RTAG is based on a single-host refinable information flow tracking
system RAIN, with extended development of the tagging system. Specifically, our imple-
mentation adds 830 lines of C code to the Linux kernel for the tag association module,
2,500 lines of C++ code to the DIFT engine for the tag switch mechanism, 1,100 lines
of C++ code for the maintenance of tags, 900 lines of C++ code for the query handler,
and 500 lines of Python code for the reachability analysis for tag allocation. Currently,
RTAG runs on both the 32-bit and 64-bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. Accordingly, our DIFT engine
supports both x86 and x86_64 architectures, which is based on libdft [33] and its extended
x86_64 version from [91]. We use a graph database Neo4j [61] for storing and analyzing
coarse-level provenance graphs, and a relational database PostgreSQL [92] for global tags
with multiple indexing on host (i.e., MAC address) and file credentials (i.e., inode, dev,
crtime). Particularly, we supplement the tag data structure §4.6.4 and how we track socket
session §4.6.6 with implementation details in the following.
Tag Data Structure. In the current implementation, RTAG maintains local tags for
individual bytes. RTAG uses C++’s vector as the multi-tag container for one memory
location or register and uses sorting and binary search in the case of insert operation.
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vector has storage efficiency, although its insertion overhead is higher than that of the
set data structure, which was used by DataTracker [45]. We make this choice based on
x86 instruction statistics [93] that show the most popularly used instructions are mov, push,
and pop of which the propagation policy copies the tag(s), while instructions that involve
insertion, such as add and and, are much less frequent. Our evaluation affirms this choice
that the time overhead for single DIFT is similar between RTAG and previous work [45].
Tracking Socket Session. The implementation of tracking the socket communication
session refers to the socket structure inside the kernel for IP and port of the host and the
peer. If the type of socket is SOCK_STREAM (i.e., TCP), we use a counter counting the total
number of bytes sent or received by tracking the return value of send or write system calls.
If the type is SOCK_DGRAM (i.e., UDP), our implementation embeds a four-byte incrementing
sequence number within the same peer IP and port number at the beginning of the payload
buffer inside an in-kernel function sendmsg rather than the system call functions such as
send and recv to avoid affecting the interface to the user program as well as the checksum
computation. At the receiver side, we strip the sequence number in the recvmsg after the
checksum verification and present the original payload to the program. As shown in §4.8.2,
the hooking at this level incurs almost no overhead in either bandwidth or socket handling
time. It also avoids the complicated fragmentation procedure at the lower level.
4.8 Evaluation
Our evaluation addresses the following questions:
• How well does RTAG handle the data flow queries (forward, backward, and point-to-
point) for cross-host attack investigations? (§4.8.1)
• How well does RTAG improve the efficiency of DIFT-based analysis in terms of time
and memory consumption? (§4.8.2)
• How much overhead does RTAG cause to system runtime including the network
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bandwidth? (§4.8.2, §4.8.2) What is the storage footprint of running RTAG? (§4.8.2)
Settings. We run RTAG based on the Ubuntu 12.04 64-bit LTS with 4-core Intel Xeon
CPU, 4GB RAM and 1TB SSD hard drive on a virtual machine using KVM [94] for the target
hosts where system-wide executions are recorded. On the analysis host, we use a machine
with 8-core Intel Xeon CPU W3565, 192 GB RAM, and 2TB SSD hard drive installed with
Ubuntu 12.04 64-bits for handling the query and performing DIFT tasks in parallel. We use
NFS [95] to share the log data between the target and the analysis host.
4.8.1 Security Applications
Table 4.1 summarizes the statistics in every stage of processing a query for an attack
investigation: the original provenance graph covering all the hosts, the pruned graph where
the unrelated causalities are filtered out by the reachability analysis, and the data flow overlay
where the tags store the origins of each byte of data involved in the query. Prov Graph are
the original graph containing the system-wide executions of every process. Pruned Graph
are the subgraph where nodes and edges that are unrelated to the attack are pruned out; DF
Overlay are results from the RTAG tagging system; Tags gives the number of generated tag
entries; C-Tags gives the number of tags of which the key and value(s) are Cross-host (i.e.,
from different hosts); Accuracy shows the percentage of how many data flows are matched
with the ground truth. Table 4.2 also summarizes how long each of the queries took and
their memory consumption. Tasks stands for the number of processes that are replayed
with DIFT; Memory gives the sum of virtual memory cost for each task; Time gives the
time duration RTAG spends to perform the DIFT tasks in parallel; TReduc% shows the
reduction rate from the time of performing the same DIFT tasks serially.
GitPwnd
We first present how RTAG handles the queries on the Gitpwnd example (described in §4.3.1).
To handle a query, we replay the involved processes independently based on reachability
73
Table 4.1: Statistics in terms of the effectiveness and performance of cross-host attack investigation.
Items Prov Graph Pruned Graph DF Overlay
Accuracy
Attack Query Node Edge Node Edge Tags C-Tags
FW: /etc/passwd
8.3K 109K
39 557 28,960 10,700 100%
GitPwnd BW: attacker host 55 1,661 32,660 18,032 100%
PP: results - objects 22 418 23,193 7,317 100%
FW: exploit html
5.3K 89K
33 711 6,799 882 100%
SQLi-1 BW: payroll record 29 683 8,257 882 100%




80 2,251 510,466 420,121 100%




89 2,379 9,224 1,766 100%
BW: salary record 97 2,270 7,700 1,766 100%
FW: exploit html
2.9K 24K
71 1,145 432,845 420,755 100%
XSS BW: attacker host 63 863 435,716 420,700 100%




74 240K 759,302 630,228 100%
FW: mp4@1st node 182 490K 3,088,102 2,532,920 100%
analysis results while performing DIFT on the interfering parts. We run RTAG on both client
and server hosts involved in this attack, while treating the attacker-controlled host as a black
box. We perform three queries: a forward query asking for where the leaked /etc/passwd
goes to, a backward query inquiring the sources of data flow that reaches the attacker’s
controlled host, and a point-to-point query aiming to particular data flow paths between
the results file on the client side and the objects file on the server side. In Table 4.1,
we show the statistics of using RTAG in every step. Particularly, we show the number of
tags RTAG creates at the tag overlay. In the forward query, RTAG generates 28,960 tag
entries totally, 10,700 of which are cross-host ones meaning the tag key and value are from
different hosts. We compare the query result with ground truth of the attack and RTAG
achieves 100% accuracy in every query. We also evaluate the performance improvement for
DIFT, summarized in Table 4.2. In general, thanks to the parallelizing of DIFT tasks, RTAG
reduces the time cost by more than 70% in most cases.
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Table 4.2: DIFT performance using RTAG.
Items DIFT Perf
Attack Query Tasks Mem(MB) Time(s) TReduc%
FW 10 497 95 87%
GitPwnd BW 27 912 113 86%
PP 8 322 79 72%
FW 14 2,513 342 70%
SQLi-1 BW 11 2,336 339 64%
PP 9 1,997 309 76%
SQLi-2
FW 41 7,655 695 83%
BW 39 6,804 677 82%
CSRF
FW 33 6,537 499 78%
BW 49 7,122 504 84%
FW 26 4,850 687 77%
XSS BW 28 5,391 705 77%
PP 19 4,107 677 72%
P2P
BW 12 6,371 201 92%
FW 12 9,855 236 91%
Web-based Attacks
We also use a set of web-based attacks to evaluate the effectiveness of RTAG in tracking
the data flow between the server (e.g., a web server Apache), and the client (e.g., a browser
Firefox). The web app facilitates the checking and updating of employees’ personal
financial information. The employees typically manage their bank account number and
routing number via the web app. The attacks include two SQL injections, one cross-site
request forgery (CSRF), and one cross-site scripting (XSS). We set up RTAG on both server
and client. We run an Apache server with SQLite as its database. At the client, we load
exploit pages with either a data transfer tool Curl or the Firefox browser. For each attack,
we perform three types of queries and compare the query results with the ground truth.
SQL injections. The exploit takes advantage of a vulnerability at the server’s SQL parsing
filter to execute illegal query statements that steal or tamper the server database. The first
attack (SQLi-1) injects an entry of user profile to the database. The added profile is further
used by another financial program to generate payroll records. The analyst performs a
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forward query from the loaded html file with the exploit, and RTAG returns the data flows
from the file at the client to the data in the payroll records. The second attack (SQLi-2)
steals data entries in the database from the user and exploits a vulnerability in Firefox to
dump the entries to a file. With a backward query from the dump file at the user side, RTAG
pinpoints the segments of the database file that has been exfiltrated.
Cross-site request forgery. The exploit uses a vulnerability of the server that miscalculates
the CSRF challenge response to submit a form impersonating the user. The form updates
the profile contents (e.g., account number), and later the tampered profile is accessed by
several other programs that process the user’s payroll information. RTAG helps determine
the data flow between the user’s loaded file and one of the payroll record that is considered
to have been tampered.
Cross-site scripting. The reflection-based cross-scripting relies on dependency of an html
element to user input to append a script that reads the sensitive data from the DOM tree of
a page, packs some of the data, and sends an email to the attacker’s external host. After
the investigation determines the attacker’s host to be malicious, it makes a backward query
from that host and finds the data exfiltration from the user’s loaded page, as well as from a
certain offset of the database storage file at the server. Notably, the resulting overlay shows
the route of some tags tracing back first to the server side (i.e., Apache), then further back to
the client side browser and the exploit html file, which recovers the reflection nature of the
attack.
Attacks Involving Memory Corruptions
To evaluate RTAG for the cases when the attacker exploits memory corruptions, we addition-
ally modified the GitPwnd attack §4.3.1 by compiling the ssh daemon with earlier versions
containing memory-based vulnerabilities: one integer overflow based on CVE-2001-0144
and one buffer overflow based on CVE-2002-0640. For the integer overflow, we patched the
ssh client side code to exploit the vulnerability [24] and remotely executed scp command
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at the server to copy files to the attacker’s controlled host. For the buffer overflow, we
crafted a malicious response for the OpenSSH (v3.0) challenge-response mechanism and
remotely executed commands [25]. We note that memory-corruption-based attacks usually
involve undefined behavior of the program that violates the assumption of many previous
investigation systems using source or binary semantics (e.g., [23, 12, 11]). However, RTAG
successfully reconstructs the program state of the overflow for the DIFT to recover the
fine-grained data flow.
File Spreading in Peer-to-Peer Network
We also run RTAG to track the data flows in a malicious-file-spreading incident on top of
a P2P network, which is regarded an increasing threat in the decentralized file sharing,
according to a report by BitSight Insight [96]. This allows us to demonstrate RTAG’s ability
to handle a complex cross-host data-flow analysis involving multiple parties, which is
infeasible with existing approaches. We use Gtk-Gnutella [87](v1.1.13) to set up a P2P
network in a local network of 12 nodes with RTAG running on them. We perform two
operations. First, we have two nodes online; one node shares a malicious audio mp4 file,
and another node searches for the file, discovers it and downloads it. Later, we shutdown
the first node and let a third node download the file from the second node. We performed
this type of single-hop relay iteratively until five nodes have this file. Second, we use these
five nodes as “seeds” and let the remaining nodes search, discover, and download the file.
During this process, we intentionally shutdown parts of the nodes to introduce “resume”
procedures. Finally, we perform a backward query from the audio file at the last node to
search for the origin of the file, and a forward query from the first node to uncover how the
file spread across the network with fine-grained-level data flows. RTAG returns the results
with 100% accuracy. Particularly, the result also shows the data flow between each pair of
nodes for each iteration of the file sharing procedure. The statistics of this experiment are




We compare the memory consumption and execution time of RTAG with previous DIFT
systems. For the memory efficiency, we evaluated two state-of-the-art DIFT engines that
provide multi-color symbols, Dytan [32] and DataTracker [45]. Table 4.3 shows the peak
memory consumption of the tag map for various DIFT tasks we used in evaluating the
security application in §4.8.1. #Symbols denotes the number of symbols used in performing
the DIFT task; NA means the DIFT is not complete so the peak memory cost is not available.
The peak memory consumption is useful as it indicates the required resource for a certain
type of DIFT. Notably, all the tag sizes for representing the DIFT symbols determined by
reachability analysis are within three bytes (i.e., up to 16,777,216 symbols), with a majority
being two bytes (i.e., up to 65,536 symbols). This means the data pruning and reachability
analysis effectively narrow down the scope of the DIFT symbols and pinpoint the exact
bytes of data that causes the data confusion for DIFT to resolve. The savings from the tag
map consumption of RTAG is between 70% and 95%. The effect of improvement on the
general memory consumption varies across different programs in terms of their own memory
usage.
In our experiments, DIFT reduced total memory usage 10% to 50% when compared
with DataTracker [45], and by 30% to 90% compared with Dytan [32]. Since these DIFT
systems are designed with the scope of one host, in order for proper comparison against
previous DIFT systems, we only measured the cases where all the tags are within one host.
Note that this approach only compares DIFT runtime performance side by side, but does not
indicate or suggest that RTAG can only handle single-host cases. For evaluating the time
efficiency in performing DIFT tasks, we assign the same DIFT tasks to RTAG as well as to
the DIFT engine used by RAIN. Since RAIN does not support cross-host investigation, we
use RAIN to run the DIFT tasks, sequentially simulating the time consumption it needs to
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Table 4.3: DIFT Tag Map Overhead in Practice.
Programs #Symbols
Peak TagMap Cost (MB)
Reduc%
DataTracker Dytan RTAG
git-core 247 12 19 4.8 60 / 74
ssh 16,983 5.9 630 2.6 55 / 99
cli-hook 1,983 17 140 8.0 53 / 94
Curl 56,010 4.8 1,050 2.3 52 / 99
Firefox 4,091,773 155 NA 67.5 56 / NA
Apache 2,128,700 133 NA 41.7 68 / NA
serialize the network interaction and orchestrating the replays. We observe that the parallel
DIFT of RTAG takes 60%–90% less time than RAIN (Table 4.2).
Discussion. For the memory consumption, we find the taint propagation is mainly com-
posed of copy operations such that the tag map is just updated with another value. Com-
bination operation for merging the tags of two locations is not frequent. Hence, though
bit-vector (used in [32]) ensures a constant length of tag for each location even after com-
bination, the benefit is not obvious. On the contrary, its fixed size is linear to the number
of symbols, which causes out-of-memory crash when there are many symbols to tag or
(and) the many memory locations are propagated during the execution. Using set eases the
implementation complexity as it natively supports the combination operation with a good
performance. However, it incurs higher metadata cost (on x86 Linux, storing every 4-byte
data in the set incurs over 14 bytes). For the time consumption savings in RTAG, the total
time consumption depends on the longest DIFT task (e.g., Firefox session). We are looking
into integrating in-process parallel DIFT techniques to RTAG that could further bring down
the time consumption.
Runtime Overhead
We measure the runtime overhead of RTAG using two sets of benchmarks: the SPEC
CPU2006 benchmark for CPU-bound use cases and the IO-intensive benchmarks for IO
bound cases. The measurements are performed on two systems, one without RTAG and one
with RTAG enabled. The result of SPEC benchmark is given in Figure 4.4 with RAIN as
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of normalized runtime performance between RAIN and RTAG with CPU
bound benchmark SPEC CPU2006. “GEOMEAN” gives the geometric mean of the performance
numbers.
reference. The geometric mean of the runtime overhead is 4.84%, which shows RTAG has
similar low runtime overhead to previous refinable systems. We also measure the runtime
overhead using IO-intensive applications to test the performance in IO bound cases. The
benchmark is composed of four scenarios: using scp to upload a 500MB archive file, using
wget downloading a 2GB mov movie file, compiling LLVM 3.8, and using Apache to serve
an http service for file downloading. The result of IO-intensive applications is shown in
Figure 4.5. The overhead of all the items is at most 50%. We reason that the cause of the
higher overhead during file downloading and compiling is because network and file inputs
are cached during the recording time.
Network Performance Impact
We use iperf3 [97] to test the bandwidth impact of applying RTAG to typical network
protocol settings. For TCP, we measure the bandwidth both with and without having RTAG
running at different window sizes. For UDP, we set the buffer size to be similar with real
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of normalized runtime performance between RAIN and RTAG with IO
bound benchmarks.
Table 4.4: Bandwidth impact of RTAG.
Protocol Setting Bandwidth% RTT%
TCP




Buffer: 512B -0.8% +0.02%
8KB -0.05% +0.01%
128KB -0.01% +0.012%
applications such as DNS (512B), RTP (128KB). We also measure the performance impact
in the term of the end-to-end round-trip-time (RTT) for one datagram to be delivered to
the server and echoed back to the client. Both impacts are negligible. The results are
summarized in Table 4.4. The bandwidth and round-trip-time (RTT) are measured with
iperf3 benchmark using different settings for TCP and UDP protocols.
Storage Footprint
As a refinable system, RTAG has the storage overhead for the non-deterministic logs that are
used for faithful replay of the recorded system-wide process executions. This ensures the
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completeness of retroactive analysis particularly for the advanced low and slow attacks. The
storage footprint varies according to the workload on each host and is comparable with the
upstream system RAIN. Note that only the input data are stored as non-determinism, thus in
the multi-host case, the traffic from a sender to a receiver are only stored at the receiver side,
avoiding duplicated storage usage. In the use of RTAG, we observe around 2.5GB–4GB
storage overhead per day for a desktop used by a lab student (e.g., programming, web
browsing); and around 1.5GB storage overhead per day for a server hosting gitolite used
internally by five lab students for version controlling on course projects.
4.9 Related Work
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking. Dynamic taint analysis [32, 33, 35, 98, 30] is a
well-known technique for tracking information flow instruction by instruction at the runtime
of a program without relying on the semantic of a program source or binary. DIFT is
useful for policy enforcement [30], malware analysis [34], and detecting privacy leaks [35,
98]. To support intra-process tainting, Dytan [32] provides a customizable framework
for multi-color tags. DataTracker adapts standard taint tracking to provide adequate taint
marks for provenance tracking. However, taint-tracking suffers from excessive performance
overhead (e.g., the overhead of one state-of-the-art implementation, libdft [33] is six times
as high as native execution), which makes it difficult to use in a runtime environment. To
solve this problem, several approaches have been proposed to decouple DIFT from the
program runtime [99, 37, 36, 12, 11]. For example, Taintpipe [12], Straight-taint [36] and
ShadowReplica [11] pre-compute propagation models from the program source and use them
to speed up the DIFT at runtime. However, their dependency on program source disables
these systems to analyze undefined behavior. In contrast to these DIFT systems, RTAG
provides both efficient runtime (recording) and the ability to reliably replay and perform
DIFT on the undefined behavior (e.g., memory corruptions) commonly seen in recent attacks.
Jetstream [37] records the normal runtime execution and defers tainting until replay by
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Dytan [32] × Runtime Inlined High High/High
DataTracker [45] × Runtime Inlined High High/High
Panorama [34] × Runtime Inlined High High/High
ShadowReplica [11] × Runtime Inlined High Low/High
Taintpipe [12] × Runtime Inlined High Low/High
Panda [43, 69] × Replay Inlined High High/High
Arnold [9] × Replay Inlined Low High/High
RAIN × Replay Inlined Low High/High
Jetstream [37] × Replay Inlined Low Low/High
TaintExchange [70] ✓ Runtime Inlined High High/High
Cloudfence [71] ✓ Runtime Inlined High High/High
RTAG ✓ Replay Decoupled Low Low/Low
splitting an application into several epochs. DTAM [100] uses dynamic taint analysis to find
the relevant program inputs to its control flow and has a potential to reduce the workload of
a record-replay system. Similar to RTAG, TaintExchange [70] and Cloudfence [71] provide
multi-host information-flow analysis at runtime, but incur significant overhead (20× in
some cases). We summarize the comparisons between RTAG and previous DIFT-based
provenance systems in Table 4.5. “Cross Host” tells whether the system covers cross-host
analysis; “Inst Time” represents when the instrumentation is performed (i.e., runtime or
replay); “Tag Dep” shows how the tag dependency is handled; “Run Over” shows the
runtime overhead; “DIFT Over(T/M)” presents the overhead of performing DIFT in terms
of Time and Memory cost in which RTAG both achieves reductions significantly.
Provenance Capturing. Using data provenance [101] to investigate advanced attacks,
such at APTs, has become a popular area of research [72, 18, 102, 19, 23, 16, 103, 104, 21].
For example, the Linux Audit System [18], Hi-Fi [102], and PASS [19] capture system-level
provenance with less than 10% overhead. Linux provenance modules (LPM) [22] allows
developers to develop customized provenance rules to create Linux Security Modules and
LSM-like modules. SPADE [21] decouples the generation and collection of provenance data
to provide a distributed provenance platform, and ProvThings [105] generates provenance
data for IoT devices. Unfortunately, these systems are restricted to coarse-grained prove-
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nance, which generate many false dependencies. To reduce false positives and logging sizes,
Protracer [16] improves BEEP [23] to switch between unit-level tainting and provenance
propagation. In contrast, MCI [104] determines fine-grained dependencies ahead-of-time
by inferring implicit dependencies using LDX [103] and creating causal models. Data-
Tracker [45] leverages DIFT to provide fine-grained data, but incurs significant overhead.
Finally, RAIN uses record and replay to defer DIFT until replay, then uses reachability
analysis to refine the dependency graph before tainting. However, none of these systems can
provide fine-grained cross-host provenance like RTAG because they have no tag association
mechanism to support cross-host DIFT.
Network Provenance. In addition to system-wide tracking, provenance at network level
is a well-researched area [78, 49, 79]. For example, ExSPAN [78] provides a distributed
data model for storing network provenance. One challenge network provenance faces is that
it obviously cannot detect most system-level causality on end nodes. Technically, network
provenance and RTAG are orthogonal to each other, so that we can use both approaches
together to further enhance attack detection.
Record Replay System. Deterministic record-and-replay has been a well-researched area
[106, 107, 41, 85, 108]. In addition to providing faithful replay, the current state-of-the-art
techniques allow instrumentation of programs during the replay of execution [9, 43, 42].
Arnold [9] provides efficient runtime because it is a kernel based solution and can efficiently
record nondeterministic events. Aftersight [42] and PANDA [43] are hypervisor-based
solutions. Aftersite is based on VMware hypervisor (record) and QEMU (replay) while
PANDA is purely based on QEMU. Similar to RAIN, RTAG leverages Arnold to provide
efficient recording performance, however the goals and functionality of RTAG are unique
from to Arnold and could be implemented on other systems.
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4.10 Conclusion
When investigating information flow-based cross-host attacks, analysts need to manually
analyze the information flow generated by the processes running on multiple hosts. This is a
time consuming, error prone, and challenging task, due to the high number of processes and
consequently flows involved. To help analysts in this task, we propose RTAG, a system for
accurate and efficient information flow analysis that makes cross-host attack investigation
practical. We implemented and empirically evaluated RTAG by using the system to analyze
a set of real-world attacks including GitPwnd, a state-of-the-art cross-host data infiltration
attack. The system was able to provide accurate results while reducing memory consumption
by 90% and also reducing the time consumption by 60-90% compared to related work. We
have a plan to release the source code of RTAG.
We foresee several directions for future work. First, we plan to make hosts running
RTAG interoperable with hosts not running the system. To do so, we plan to embed tag
information in an optional field of the UDP header. Second, we plan to identify information
flow techniques that are resilient to the fact that RTAG might not be running on every host in
a given network. Third, we plan to integrate in-process parallel DIFT techniques to RTAG to
further optimize the analysis time. Fourth, we plan to reduce the storage requirement for
non-deterministic inputs. To do so, we plan to investigate ways to optimize the storage of
similar executions across different hosts. Finally, we plan to extend the queries supported
by RTAG so that it is possible to compare the information flow associated with different
executions of the same program. In this way, it will be possible to pinpoint when and where
a program was compromised.
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CHAPTER 5
ADVERSARIAL ENGAGEMENTS BY DARPA
To show that our approach creates a sound, reliable, and real capability to handle these
attacks, we opened our system to assault by a professional red-team group. Our systems man-
aged to survive the attacks without data loss and provide data that reconstructed the attack
behavior with high accuracy. Beyond testing RAIN and RTAG in sandboxed environments,
we further test them in the real-world adversarial campaign funded by DARPA where a
professional red team perform various attacks against our systems. Using the data generated
by our system, the analyst is able to detect the attacks and reconstruct the provenance of
them with high accuracy.
The Transparent Computing program. The Transparent Computing (TC) program aims
to test the state-of-art system monitoring tools and analysis methods for investigating stealthy
cyber attacks. In the program, a set of “system” teams provide customized systems with
monitoring capabilities that generate data for analysis; meanwhile another set of “analysis”
teams consume and analyze the data for attack investigation and forensic analysis. We are
selected to participate the program working as one system team. The program has arranged
five adversarial engagements for evaluation. In each engagement, the red team exercise
offensive attacks against a target system where the monitoring tool is deployed. They try
to stay low-key leaving no trace: they loaded themselves reflectively into memory to avoid
executing from disk; system calls were leveraged to avoid commonly monitored APIs such
as file open() and write(); modules were loaded in-memory for network recon, screen
capture, audio capture, video capture, and keylogging; and privilege escalation and process
injection are introduced to pivot to other processes.
Each engagement takes around two weeks, during which benign activities are performed
on the target host mimicking a typical workload of desktop usage. The red team then
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randomly performs attacks on the target hosts which blends with the benign data. The
analysis team consumes the stream of system events generated on the target hosts and
conducts real-time detection and analysis. The red team evaluate the system and analysis
teams in terms of investigation accuracy after each engagement.
Data Model and System Setup. Since the analysis teams work with different system
teams for consuming the data, the program defines a common data model (CDM) to unify
the data structure and interface. Every team follows this model so the data consumption
and sharing becomes easier. The CDM defines subjects, objects, and various system events
(e.g., read(), execve()), and a UUID to identify subject/object and event. We internally
also refer to this UUID system to identify the nodes and edges in our provenance graph. By
doing this, the analysis teams can query to us using the UUID. We set up the target hosts
as KVM instances, and an analysis host populating the provenance graph and translating
the data into CDM. The data are shared to the analysis team using the kafka and zookeeper
infrastructure in real time. We also have a RESTful API to support the query interface for
the analysis team to query for the fine-grained analysis results. When a query arrives, we
run reachability analysis and dispatches the replay and taint work to one of the replayers.
The result is returned back to the analysis team using CDM.
Results. We survived the five adversarial engagements by DARPA, and achieved high
detection rate and analysis accuracy. The results in TC supplement the evaluation con-
tribution of this thesis. We present the results of analysis using the data generated by by
our system. In Table 5.1, we show the number of attacks performed by the red team, the
number of attacks whose behavior is captured by our system, and the number of attacks that
are detected by the analysis team using our data. For counting the “capture” number, we
compare our data and the ground truth, and look for events related to each attack. For the
“detect” number, we count the total number of detection from both analysis teams consuming
our data. Each analysis team does not detect all the attacks, but they collectively detect all
the attacks, which indicates the effectiveness of our system as well as the high accuracy.
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Table 5.1: Results of DARPA adversarial engagements
Adversarial
Activity
# Performed # Captured # Detected
SSH Dropbear 3 3 6
Nmap Scanning and SCP 2 2 2
APT Simulation 3 3 6
Pine Metasploit 1 1 2
Phishing Email 2 2 4
Firefox Drakon APT 2 2 2
Micro APT 2 2 3
The description of each adversarial activity is in the Appendix A.
Lessons learned. We learned a lot from the engagement experience about how the detection
works, how our data at either coarse-level or fine-grained level contributes to the detection
accuracy, and the limitation of our system in the real-world environment. First, we find that
monitoring at system-call level can effectively detect most of the attacks. Even if the attack
relies on dynamic loading of payload, the analysis team can still catch the behavior via
system calls such as mmap followed by a mprotect with setting the protection to EXECUTIBLE.
Second, the analysis accuracy starts to decrease when dealing with attacks that have a pattern
similar with benign activity. Since the analysis team trained their model based on a benign
data generation period, their accuracy decreases when the attackers used benign program for
malicious purpose (e.g., using SCP to download a malicious program). Third, using our fine-
grained query interface helps remove false positive in data flow analysis. For example, our
DIFT-based fine-grained analysis ruled out a data leakage case when a malicious program
read from /etc/hosts and sent some data to a remote host. This would be a false positive
detection if the analysis only looked at the system call sequence. Fourth, due to the time cost
in DIFT, our fine-grained analysis cannot support real-time detection. The analysis team
chose to use the system-call level data for the real-time detection section of the engagement




EXPLORATION ON NEW RECORD REPLAY SYSTEM
6.1 Introduction
The record replay technique plays the key role in the refinable attack investigation system.
Systems like Arnold [9] are able to reconstruct the full program states at single instruction
granularity, which is essential for investigating memory related exploits. Though the record
replay technique achieves low-overhead recording, the fine-grained forensic analysis for
auditing the replayed execution is unnecessarily slow, because the replay still needs to go
through the instrumentation with high overhead at the “delayed” time. We aim for a more
efficient fine-grained forensic auditing of replay executions.
We envision a customizable framework that can be tuned for different analysis purposes
(e.g., data flow tracking, data race detection). For the example of a record replay for data
flow analysis, the framework only needs to record the data flow so we can guarantee to
recreate it during replay time. The data flow analysis is sufficient for most popular forensic
analysis. Besides the reduction of recording and replaying overhead, the new approach has
the potential in improving the data privacy because we can selectively skip recording some
data containing sensitive information.
6.2 Design
For the new record replay system, we transform a program into a “record” version and
a “replay” version. The record version includes instrumentations needed to replicate the
control flow and the data for analysis in replay. The replay version enforces the recorded
control flow and offers the recorded data at specific locations (e.g., at certain instruction).





















Figure 6.1: Overview of new system
port the DFSan to the framework by replaying the execution and providing the data to
DFSan. Similarly, data race detection such as ThreadSan [109] can be ported by letting the
framework only replay the data access interleavings and synchronizations. We depict the
architecture overview of the new system in Figure 6.1.
Recorder. We record certain data during recording according to the analysis we want to
perform at replay time. By replaying these recorded data directly, the program does not
need to replay every program state in order to recreate the desired program states for the
analysis. For example, for a data flow analysis, it is sufficient to replay the data flow if the
loading of pointer is recorded.
Replayer. We transform the program into a replayer by constructing the “skeleton” of the
program — only the recorded control flow is enforced at the replay. At the base level, the
replayer works as a control flow replayer. Then, we selectively add the instructions into
the replayer for the needs of analysis. For example, for DFSan as analysis, we record the
address of the pointer being loaded, then replay the address at replay time. The recorded
address will be presented at the corresponding IR instruction for the DFSan to track data
flow. Other executions such as the external library calls are skipped since they are not related
to the analysis (e.g., data flow).
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6.3 Implementation
Kernel module for PT/PTW. We explore using a new hardware feature called Intel
Processor trace and Processor trace write for the recording. Intel released Processor Trace
(PT) as a built-in feature for obtaining the control flow of the processor for debugging
purposes. A variety of work have demonstrated improvement of traditional analysis such
as CFI thanks to the runtime efficiency of PT (e.g., [110, 111, 112]). Intel Processor Trace
Write (PTW) was released recently to enhance the debugging capability on top of PT. Intel
adds PTW as a new intrinsic into the x86 and x86_64 instruction set. For the 64bit, PTW can
accommodate an 8-byte long data payload. The developer needs to instrument the program
using PTW instructions. Compared with traditional compiler-level instrumentation tools,
the PTW instruction provides essential debugging data more efficiently. To make PT and
PTW available, Linux kernel adds the data transferring and parsing utility into the perf
functionality. Unfortunately, there exists data loss issues in perf, so we develop a kernel
module for data handling facility.
We implemented the kernel module to transfer the PT and PTW data from CPU to the
file system. The CPU has an internal buffer for storing the PT and PTW data. The size
of the buffer is limited so one needs to copy the data out to memory. If the data is not
copied out in time, data overflow could happen such that new data pollute the old data that
is still in the buffer. To ensure the copying is in time and frequent enough, we rely on the
interrupt handling routine to trigger this copying. The copyed data are stored in the kernel
memory (i.e., kmem_cache). We use a work_queue to flush the data from the kernel memory
to persistence.
Program transformation. We implemented an LLVM IR level tool to generate the
recorder and replayer. The recorder adds instrumentation using PTWrite intrinsics the
loading of pointers. The replayer enforces the control flow by reading the PT data and
determining the branch result. Replays of data (e.g., loading of pointer) is done by reading
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the PTW data.
Closing the gap between IR and binary. Since our tranformation works at LLVM IR
level, while the PT/PTW data comes from the the X86 binary level, we need to fix the
mismatch between these two levels. For example, the destinations in the conditional branch
at IR level can lead to different cases at binary level. The code gen can yield the changed
order of jump-to and fall-through destinations. We automated the comparison between the
IR and the binary and handle the difference in the transformation.
6.4 Lessons learned
As soon as we have the kernel module and the program tranformation implemented, we find
a technical problem in recording. Basically, when testing the SPEC CPU benchmark or the
Splash multi-thread benchmark, we find two types of data loss. First, there is data overflow
inside the CPU buffer. This is due to intensive PTWrite operations such that if the distance
between two PTWrite is too short, the internal buffer inclines to get overflowed. Second,
there is out-of-memory issue for the kernel memory. Basically, the data of PT and PTW are
dominating the use of kernel memory such that the kernel becomes out of memory. This
results in a kmem_cache_alloc error. These two issues are both due to high volume of data
generated by PT/PTW, mainly PTW. In order to resolve these, we tried different approaches.
Slowing down. For intensive PTW operations, we strive to slow down the program. We
add spins between two close PTW operations, so the kernel has more chance to ship the data
out before leaving the buffer full. We do a spin adding based on the profiling result showing
the distance between each two PTWrite, and add spins to the hottest and most intensive
PTWrite. This alleviates the data loss cases, but does increase the recording overhead.
Optimization. We also attempted to reduce the data from the origin. We optimized the
recording by moving the PTWrite out of a loop if it is invariant. We also search for and
record the origin of pointers instead of uses. We do a backward traversal from the use of
pointer and search for the path that has least overhead in recording. Then at the replay
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time, we replay the origin, and the instructions leading to the use of pointer, the pointer is
recovered at the same location of use as previously, but the recording overhead is reduced.
This optimization helped reduce the recording overhead, but the data loss still exist in many
benchmark items.
6.5 Hybrid Approach
Currently, we are exploring a hybrid approach that both selectively records program inputs
(i.e., for replay states recreation) and directly records certain program states for analysis. For
recording program inputs, we record most of external function returns and side effects. For
recording program states directly, we run static analysis and dynamic profiling to determine
which record states will be needed in order for the desired replay states to be present in the
analysis. Based on the record states, we instrument the program accordingly. By doing this,




In this thesis, I have defended the thesis statement by demonstrating how refinable attack
investigation achieves both high efficient runtime of the program and the fine-grained
program behavior at the instruction level, even in today’s complex multi-host systems. I first
presented a record-replay-based attack investigation system that can achieve instruction-level
data as well as an efficient runtime. Then I presented a tagging mechanism that extends
the scope of the framework to multiple hosts that have data dependency with each other.
Refinable investigation enables a strong postmortem analysis such that the analyst can time
travel to a past moment to replay an execution with fine-grained analysis.
The current implementation of the systems resides inside the Linux kernel. Typical
kernel protection methods need to be implaced to avoid the kernel from being compromised.
Also, the deployability is limited as one needs to port the system to another version of kernel
if necessary. We envision a userspace based implementation is possible such as the RR [59]
project. Another direction would be to add application specific instrumentations to complex
programs. Since system-call level events are too low level for such applications, in order to
reason the data causality and attack procedure, application specific data at higher level are
needed. For example, instrumenting the access of DOM tree elements and javascript-level
objects can help understand more browser specific attacks such as phishing, cross-site
scripting (e.g., [113, 114]). Combining the refinable capability with these higher level






SSH Dropbear. Dropbear is a widely used SSH server available in FreeBSD and
Ubuntu package managers [115]. The modification is a hardcoded key, with a compar-
ison for “ta5rules” in svr_auth_password() of svr-authpasswd.c. The second inserts
a hardcoded public key into dropbear’s stream when it reads the authorized keys file in
svr-authpubkeys.c. This has the effect that any attacker with the private key gains access
without a password, and the authorized keys file is not modified.
Nmap Scanning. The red team implements a couple rudimentary network scan features
reinforcing the network recon and pivoting capability. The tool avoids simply including an
nmap binary since it is often identified as an attacker’s tool.
APT Simulation. APT Simulation uses TCP communication for C2 and supported getfile,
putfile, execfile, and shell commands. Commands are sent via messages created using
Google Protocol Buffers with the nanopb plugin to minimize size. Modules are deployed to
the target by writing them to disk and executing them. A new shell process and connection
out to the C2 server provides a remote shell capability, but all commands run in the shell
(such as whoami, hostname) result in new processes created using commands from the target
environment.
Pine Metasploit. Pine is patched to add a backdoor to the mail view code that checks
for a specific file attachment named “tcexec”. If the e-mail has an attachment that is an
application with name “tcexec”, the backdoor writes the attachment to file at /tmp/tcexec,
changes the permissions to 777, forks a new process, and calls execve on “/tmp/tcexec”. The
attachment is expected to be an executable binary, such as drakon APT or micro APT, which
is run as a new process and not in the memory of the Pine process. Additionally, the Pine
patch also collects IMAP usernames and passwords and writes them to file /tmp/tcexfil.
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Phishing Email. Spear phishing is a popular technique where the attacker sends an e-mail
that looks legitimate to trick the user into doing something they should not to do to help
the attacker achieve an objective. The goal of phishing is to get the user to unwittingly
download and run the malware or to give away their credentials or personal information.
Firefox Drakon APT. Drakon APT improves upon APT simulation by introducing more
advanced capabilities and avoiding actions known to be detected. Over the course of
Transparent Computing program, Drakon APT moves increasingly more functionality into
in-memory to avoid writing to disk and creating new processes. Drakon APT supports getfile,
putfile, execfile, and shell commands but does not rely on them nearly as much, especially
execfile and shell. In their place, Drakon APT uses built-in commands via syscalls and
module loading bypassing the OS library loaders. Syscalls allows for the implementation of
built-in commands such as whoami, hostname, ls, ps, cd, pwd, and others. By using
syscalls directly, Drakon APT is able to avoid using well-known API functions such as
open. If those API functions are being monitored, they will miss Drakon APT’s use of that
functionality. Other changes are made too in order to obfuscate attacks, including switching
from TCP to HTTP with encrypted payloads. APT simulation uses unencrypted TCP which
could be captured and analyzed by performers. Drakon APT sends HTTP requests and
responses with image payloads where the image is actually an encrypted command request
or response.
Micro APT. Micro APT is an attempt at a minimal size but still full featured APT simu-
lacrum using its own C2 interface instead of Drakon APT’s OC2. It is built with mostly
the same functionality as Drakon APT but without Google Protocol Buffers, pthread, etc in
order to significantly reduce size. Additionally, Micro APT adds support for running Python
scripts on the target, scanning the network using nmap. Because of Micro APT’s minimal
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